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The research in this thesis explores the wide reaching impacts of intelligence 
activities outside the enclave of the international intelligence community. Chapter one 
explores the impact U.S. intelligence analysis had on the Cold War policy of attempting to 
enact regime change in other countries.  Through a series of case studies, it is determined that 
intelligence analysis was likely able to have influenced policymaking.  Chapter 2 examines 
how violent non-state actors’ intelligence functions have developed over the past two 
decades (since 1997).  Three case studies determine that the intelligence functions of VNSAs 
generally have shown significant developments over the past two decades and that these 
developments mirror developments seen in in states’ intelligence agencies, although delayed.  
Chapter 3 assesses how the recent insertion of space based military and intelligence assets by 
lesser and new space faring nations has impacted how nations interaction in space.  A series 
of case studies surveying the behaviors of space faring nations after the first insertion of 
military and intelligence assets by several lesser and new space faring nations determines that 
though there has been an increased level of cooperation in space, there is evidence to suggest 
the domain is now a more competitive environment.  In examining some of the expected and 
unexpected effects of intelligence activities, this thesis aims to enrich the field of intelligence 
studies by addressing several under researched topics. 
 
Advisor: Dr. Mark Stout, Johns Hopkins University 





Thank you to all family, friends, colleagues, and JHU instructors who supported the 







Table of Contents 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 1: COLD WAR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
POLICY MAKING ................................................................................................................................... 6 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................................... 6 
LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................................................................... 7 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS .............................................................................................................................. 14 
METHODS .............................................................................................................................................................. 16 
DATA ...................................................................................................................................................................... 18 
Iran .............................................................................................................................................................................. 18 
Guatemala ............................................................................................................................................................... 21 
Republic of the Congo ......................................................................................................................................... 24 
Brazil .......................................................................................................................................................................... 26 
DISCUSSION .......................................................................................................................................................... 28 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................................ 34 
CHAPTER 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS’ 
INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS ........................................................................................................ 36 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................... 36 
LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................................................................ 37 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS .............................................................................................................................. 44 
METHODS .............................................................................................................................................................. 45 
DATA ...................................................................................................................................................................... 46 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army ..................................................................................................... 47 
Al-Qaeda ................................................................................................................................................................... 50 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) .............................................................................................. 56 
DISCUSSION .......................................................................................................................................................... 59 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................................ 63 
CHAPTER 3: THE IMPACT OF NEW SPACE BASED MILITARY AND 
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS ON SPACE RELATIONS ....................................................... 65 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................... 65 
LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................................................................ 67 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS .............................................................................................................................. 76 
METHODS .............................................................................................................................................................. 77 
DATA ...................................................................................................................................................................... 78 
Japan .......................................................................................................................................................................... 82 
Turkey ........................................................................................................................................................................ 85 
South America ........................................................................................................................................................ 88 
DISCUSSION .......................................................................................................................................................... 91 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................................ 94 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................... 97 
APPENDICES ....................................................................................................................................... 101 
A BRIEF TIMELINE OF NEW SPACE-BASED MILITARY & INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS ............... 101 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................ 102 




List of Tables 
 




When intelligence agencies and their activities receive attention in the news and 
in popular culture, they are often portrayed as existing in a dark, shadowy world that is 
separate from every-day life.  This portrayal may feel accurate because governments are 
wont to keep quiet about their clandestine dealings. In reality intelligence activities 
influence many parts of everyday life.  This tendency to view intelligence activities on 
the periphery has also affected much of the academic work focusing on intelligence.  For 
example, research in the field of intelligence studies has been cited as insular, focusing on 
the impacts of outside factors on intelligence activities.  Moreover, much of the research 
is focused on internal intelligence operations such as collection and analysis (parts of the 
broader intelligence cycle), intelligence successes and failures, and the use of covert 
actions.1  Literature covering these topics is valuable to advancing the field of 
intelligence studies and helps strengthen the less than clear definition of intelligence.  
This thesis attempts to step outside these topics by examining how intelligence activities 
shape state behavior and interaction by impacting other areas such as international 
relations, policy-making, and the behaviors of violent non-state actors (VNSA). In 
examining some of the expected and unexpected effects of intelligence activities, this 
thesis aims to enrich the field of intelligence studies by addressing several under 
researched topics. 
The first chapter in this portfolio explores how (US) intelligence analysis 
influenced the Cold War policy of attempting to enact regime change in foreign 
                                                 
1 Lock K. Johnson and Allison M. Shelton, “Thoughts on the State of Intelligence Studies: A Survey 
Report,” Intelligence & National Security, Vol. 28.1, 111-115. 
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countries.  This question was chosen for several reasons.  First, though much research has 
been done to examine the impacts that policy has on intelligence, there has been 
insufficient attention paid to the role intelligence analysis played in significant policy 
decisions, some of which continue to shape the world decades after their implementation.  
Additionally, this question presented an opportunity to add a layer of depth to the 
scholarly work done in the field of Cold War political history by providing a thorough 
assessment of the intelligence analysis policymakers were provided regarding regimes 
that were determined averse to US interests at the time.   
Informed by several theories in the existing literature on intelligence analysis, a 
hypothesis was formed that intelligence analysis had little influence on the US policy of 
attempting to enact regime change in foreign countries during the Cold War.  A series of 
case studies analyzing the intelligence products provided to the executive proves that this 
hypothesis was incorrect.  In fact, most of the intelligence products examined provided 
assessments that the regime in question was under imminent threat of falling to 
Communism, was already linked to Communism, or directly threatened US interests.  
The consistency between the intelligence analysis and the policy outcomes demonstrates 
that intelligence analysis may have influenced policymaking in these instances, but was 
insufficient to unequivocally prove direct influence.  This study is valuable because it 
opens the door for further research on this question and provides research methods to 
apply to other policy areas.  Furthermore, this research demonstrates the 
interconnectedness between intelligence studies and policy studies.  
The second chapter is an examination of how violent non-state actors (VNSA) 
employ intelligence activities and recent developments in their methods.  This research 
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includes a comparative study of the intelligence agencies of states (such as the CIA in the 
US and MI-5 in the United Kingdom) and the intelligence functions of VNSA.  The 
existing literature on non-state actors conducting intelligence activities shows that they 
often mirrored those activities of state intelligence agencies.  To provide a point of 
comparison for the development of VNSA intelligence functions over time, the literature 
review describes major trends in states’ intelligence agencies over the past fifty years.   
The recent data covering three VNSA demonstrate that their intelligence functions 
follow many of the same trends seen in state intelligence agencies, only delayed.  Perhaps 
chief among these trends is the increased reliance on technology for intelligence 
collection. Many of the technologies VNSA utilize for intelligence collection that are 
freely available today were created by state intelligence agencies. For example, the USSR 
and US created satellites to spy on each other from above and became increasingly reliant 
on these systems over time.  As the technologies for satellites that provide imagery 
proliferated to the public, VNSA were quick to employ commercially available satellite 
imagery in their intelligence activities.  While this is only one example, the data 
demonstrate that VNSA have largely mirrored their intelligence functions after state 
intelligence agencies.  By highlighting another area in which states’ intelligence activities 
impact an outside entity, namely VNSA, this research provides a new lens through which 
to examine intelligence.  Moreover, it demonstrates how vital intelligence functions are to 
the continued existence of VNSA and how states may adjust their strategies in dealing 
with such groups. 
The final chapter of this portfolio examines how intelligence activities impact 
international relations.  The chapter focuses specifically on the recent insertion of 
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military and intelligence systems into outer space by lesser and new space faring nations.  
Born in the early days of the Cold War, satellites quickly entered the intelligence 
collection tool-kits of the USSR and US. These systems allow for largely risk-free 
intelligence collection and can provide real time, actionable intelligence about any target 
on the globe.  There is a wealth of literature on the space race between the USSR and US 
in the field of international relations.  However, less research has studied the recent 
increase of new military and intelligence satellites inserted into space by lesser, or 
entirely new, space faring nations, and the subsequent complication of the geopolitics in 
this arena. This chapter builds on the existing literature by examining how the recent 
insertions of military and intelligence assets into space by lesser and new space faring 
nations has impacted the way nations interact in space.  
To answer the research question, a series of case studies analyze interactions 
between space faring nations subsequent to several new military and intelligence space 
programs instituted since 2000.  The data reveal that despite a stable or perhaps increased 
number of cooperative space activities as compared to the first fifty years of space 
exploration, there are legitimate arguments to be made that the space environment is now 
more competitive.  The data suggest that new nations inserting military and intelligence 
systems into space are vying for regional dominance in space activities, and are utilizing 
cooperative agreements as a means to strengthen their space programs.  
The conclusions of this research are a significant contribution to the study of how 
intelligence activities impact other arenas.  It is difficult to study international 
interactions in intelligence because of the clandestine nature of these activities.  For 
example, data on international reactions to a new intelligence liaison relationship between 
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two nations is understandably limited.  However, this research shows that some nations 
publicize their new intelligence gathering satellites as a point of pride and that nations 
opposing their neighbors’ new capabilities at times publicly voiced condemnation.  
Moreover, this research provides a model by which to evaluate other impacts intelligence 
activities may have on international relations. A similar research design could be utilized 
to demonstrate how the establishment of other military and intelligence functions has 
impacted international relations. These conclusions could help to elevate the visibility of 
the impacts intelligence activities have on other areas, such as foreign relations. 
Each chapter in this portfolio illustrates an instance where intelligence activities 
shape states’ behavior by impacting other areas such as international relations, policy 
making, and geopolitics.  By stepping outside of the existing literature on intelligence 
activities, which tends to be inward looking, the conclusions of these chapters are 
expected to raise attention to the wide-reaching implications that intelligence activities 
have in other arenas.  The research designs and suggestions for further research are also 
intended to open the door for additional research about intelligence activities and their 









Chapter 1: Cold War Intelligence Analysis and its Effects on 
Policy Making 
Introduction 
Much of the discussion of the intelligence community centers on operational 
aspects of intelligence and the various collection disciplines.  There is also a robust 
dialogue about intelligence analysis and how it has developed over time.  The debate 
mostly surrounds the strengths and weaknesses of analysis, its areas of focus, its accuracy 
and its utility.  Much attention has been given to “intelligence failures” throughout the 
history of the US Intelligence Community, such as the failure to predict the fall of the 
Soviet Union, the failure to predict the 9/11 attacks, and the Iraqi WMD Estimate.  
Despite these vibrant and important discussions, there are still questions that remain 
unanswered in our evaluations of the role the intelligence community and its analytical 
products play in informing policy.  In a 2012 survey of editorial board members of 
Intelligence and National Security, the question “what are the most over- and under-
researched topics of research in the field of intelligence studies?” was posed.2  In 
answering the “under-researched” part of the question, two leading intelligence studies 
scholars, Richard Betts and Robert Jervis, concurred that the field of intelligence studies 
is perhaps “under-researched on the central question of the influence of intelligence on 
policy,” whereas the inverse is well known.3  This paper will seek to address that very 
question by assessing, through a series of case studies, how intelligence analysis did or 
did not influence the policy decisions to attempt to enact regime change in foreign 
countries during the Cold War. 
                                                 
2 Lock K. Johnson and Allison M. Shelton, “Thoughts on the State of Intelligence Studies: A Survey 




At times when national security is considered threatened, the President has many 
tools at his or her disposal to determine what is the best course of action and, 
subsequently, to act.  During the Cold War, the newly formed intelligence apparatus of 
the United States became one of the foremost instruments for combatting Communism.  
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stations were established in foreign countries that 
served as the clandestine battlefields of the Cold War.  Intelligence gathering reached far 
and wide, while analysts worked to piece together assessments of Russian capabilities 
and influence.  As will be discussed in this paper, it is the role of intelligence analysis to 
inform the policy maker in times of uncertainty.  At the time of the case studies 
examined, the United States was gripped by a fear of Communism, and the policies in 
place aimed at combatting Soviet influence on a global scale were proving ineffectual in 
easing these worries.  An examination of the intelligence analysis presented to the 
executive in the following cases of US backed coups in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), 
Congo (1960), and Brazil (1964), will reveal if the intelligence establishment, albeit in its 
early days, was in fact able to achieve its purpose of informing policy. 4 
Literature Review 
In order to better understand what role intelligence analysis played in informing 
policy making, it is important to understand certain fundamental tenets of intelligence 
analysis.  First, what is intelligence, and when do policy makers rely on it?  In other 
words, what are the general instances in which we expect policy makers to utilize 
intelligence to inform policy making?  Second, what role is intelligence analysis intended 
to play in the intelligence process?  It is important to understand where analysis is 
                                                 
4 The term “executive” in this paper refers to: the President, the National Security Council or any of its 




situated in relation to the customer, namely the policy maker, as well as the other aspects 
of the Intelligence cycle.  Lastly, has the answer to the second question changed over 
time, or does it remain constant?  As a nascent tool in the National Security apparatus of 
the United States, the intelligence community was still finding its way in the early years 
of the Cold War.   So too were the Presidential administrations learning how to utilize 
this apparatus, and each administration varied widely on how they did so.  Today, there 
are widely accepted understandings of what role intelligence analysis should ideally play, 
and when policy makers are expected to rely upon it.  There is more debate about how 
this has changed over time and between administrations.  By first identifying the answers 
to these questions and pinpointing the key debates, we can better understand the role 
intelligence analysis is intended to fill in informing policy.  Moreover, we can better 
identify whether or not intelligence achieved its intended goals or not in the case studies 
examined. 
 Determining when the policy maker calls upon intelligence invokes the very 
definition of intelligence itself.  This definition is admittedly varied and murky at best, 
according to many scholars in the field of intelligence studies.5   From these varied 
definitions, however, we see common threads as to when intelligence is expected to 
inform policy.  Lowenthal offers the following reasons for when intelligence is relied 
upon: to avoid strategic surprise, to provide long-term expertise, to support the policy 
process, and to maintain the secrecy of information, needs, and methods.6  In this 
explanation we see both the need for immediate intelligence – avoiding strategic 
                                                 
5 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, sixth ed. (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2015), p. 1-
2. 
6 Mark M. Lowenthal, “What is Intelligence?” in Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, sixth ed. (Los 
Angeles: CQ Press, 2015), p. 2-5. 
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surprise—and long-term analysis.  Lowenthal also emphasizes that intelligence is 
intended to support the policy process in a variety of ways.  Betts offers us an additional, 
slightly broader reason why policy makers rely on intelligence: “It is the role of 
intelligence to extract certainty from uncertainty and to facilitate coherent decision in an 
incoherent environment.”7  Betts is quick to point out that this reality has led to a 
heightened (and often unrealistic) expectation of what intelligence can actually provide 
for the policy maker.  When identifying how intelligence serves the policy maker, 
Johnson adopts the definition of intelligence proposed by British scholars Gill and 
Pythian that intelligence is: 
[A]imed at maintaining or enhancing relative security by providing 
forewarning of threats or potential threats in a manner that allows for the 
timely implementation of a preventive policy or strategy, including, where 
deemed desirable, covert activities.8 
 
While this explanation draws many similarities to Lowenthal’s, it also includes the 
important distinction that intelligence serves to support policy making regarding covert 
activities, such as influencing regime change in a foreign country.  Treverton concurs that 
the purpose of intelligence is to mitigate threats, and adds that in order to do so it must 
solve puzzles and attempt to solve mysteries.  By this, he means that there are questions – 
puzzles – intelligence can answer if all the pieces are available.  Mysteries are 
unsolvable, but clarity and insight can be provided.9  With slight variations in the 
definitions provided by these scholars, we see a constant theme that intelligence analysis 
is intended to provide the policy maker with information to warn about current threats, 
                                                 
7 Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 30. 
8 Lock Johnson, National Security Intelligence, p. 15; Peter Gill and Mark Pythian, Intelligence in an 
Insecure World (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2006), p. 7. 
9 Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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inform decision-making, and aid the policy process.  Policy makers are generally 
expected to rely on intelligence for indications and warnings of threats, subject matter 
expertise, and to provide clarity where uncertainty exists.   
While there are different interpretations as to precisely when policy makers rely 
upon intelligence analysis, there is a consensus that there are day-to-day needs for 
intelligence from the executive pertaining to the most pressing national security needs, 
regardless of a request for specific information.  For the most part, presidents receive 
current intelligence daily in the form of the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).  In some 
instances, intelligence products are requested on an ad-hoc basis.  On other issues long-
term forecasts are needed.  In the case of long-term intelligence, the most common 
product is a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), a collective product produced from 
analysis by all member agencies of the Intelligence Community.  Johnson points out that 
different administrations have called for NIEs at varying rates, and in the absence of such 
requests, the intelligence community is left to its own devices to decide when to produce 
them.10 
As the term “intelligence” encompasses many aspects, it is important to 
understand more precisely where analysis is situated in the process.  Johnson offers us a 
model termed “the intelligence cycle,” in which planning and direction from the policy 
maker sets priorities for the collection of intelligence, the fruits of which are then 
processed, analyzed, and disseminated.  As implied by the term cycle, this process flows 
in a never-ending circle.11  This has become known as the “standard model” of the 
                                                 
10 Loch K. Johnson, National Security Intelligence: Secret Operations in Defense of the Democracies 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2012), 58-60. 
11 Loch K. Johnson, National Security Intelligence: Secret Operations in Defense of the Democracies 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2012), 37-38. 
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intelligence cycle.  Marrin advances a challenge to the standard model, in which the 
intelligence community more frequently pushes intelligence priorities to the policy 
maker, as opposed to the policy maker pulling information from the intelligence 
community.12  It is Marrin’s belief that the standard model has never been an accurate 
representation of the intelligence cycle, and suggests a more accurate interpretation is that 
intelligence requirements flow both ways, top-down and bottom-up.  The “intelligence 
process” as defined by Lowenthal, is “the steps or stages in intelligence, from policy 
makers perceiving a need for information to the community’s delivery of an analytical 
intelligence product to them.”13  In this definition, the process is ideally cyclical and 
multi-layered.  Requirements are set, collection is undertaken, the information goes 
through processing and exploitation (P&E), and analysis then takes place, after which a 
product is disseminated, consumed, and finally, feedback is given.  Lowenthal notes there 
are many variables in this process, but it is clear where analysis comes in to play: taking 
information and turning it into consumable reports for policy makers. What Lowenthal’s 
expanded model accounts for is a back and forth between the analysis, collection, and 
policy maker’s feedback stages of the process.  Accordingly, we see policy makers and 
analysts informing collection priorities, and feedback from the policy makers regarding 
their requirements.14  Despite the variations mentioned above, the existing scholarship 
largely agrees upon the role of and place for analysis.  Intelligence analysis is meant to 
take processed information, assess it, and turn it into a relevant, timely, objective product 
for dissemination to policy makers.   
                                                 
12 Stephen Marrin, “Intelligence Analysis and Decision-Making: Methodological challenges,” in 
Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates, ed. Mark Pythian, Peter Gill and Stephen Marrin 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 131-132. 
13 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, sixth ed. (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2015), 70. 
14 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 72. 
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 Understanding how analysis fits into the intelligence process and when it is called 
upon helps us understand the role it is expected to play in the larger picture of policy 
making.  The remaining question is whether or not this role has changed over time.  This 
is perhaps the question with the most disagreement among intelligence scholars, although 
there are consistent themes as well.  Most scholars agree that each administration will 
have a different perception of the utility of intelligence for informing policy-making.  
However, there is debate about whether the passage of time has the same effect in 
shaping the purpose of intelligence analysis.  Treverton offers the idea that after the Cold 
War, as attention shifted from nation-state threats to non-state actors, the requirements for 
intelligence have changed.15  Treverton emphasizes the idea that while the role of 
informing the policy maker will still exist, expansions will be made to sharing 
intelligence with law enforcement, international allies, and with non-state entities such as 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the UN, among others.  Moreover, as the 
role of intelligence expands, so too does the mission for intelligence analysts.  Lowenthal 
also outlines the variety of challenges analysis faces when there are paradigm shifts in the 
threat environment.  Lowenthal also notes that as technology has created a larger offering 
of new and improved intelligence products, the role of analysis has grown for certain 
disciplines, such as imagery analysis.16  Medina posits that because information has 
become more abundant over time, intelligence analysis has to find a different way to add 
value to what a policy maker likely already knows.  Because policy makers are receiving 
more raw intelligence and are better informed on global issues today than they were thirty 
years ago (thanks to improved communications), analysts need to be more adventurous to 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, p. 109-111. 
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provide analysis that is more policy-relevant and will do more to inform beyond what is 
already known.17  Marrin concurs, and further hypothesizes that there is a recent trend in 
American foreign policy that intelligence analysis was ignored by policymakers.18  A 
weakness of the existing literature is the lack of discussion of how intelligence analysis is 
actually able to inform policy, the very purpose it is meant to serve, as time has passed 
and the threat environment has changed. 
Although there are varying views about the role of intelligence analysis over time, 
there is a consensus among scholars that there is an emphasis from policy makers, more 
so today than ever, on current intelligence, as opposed to long-term analysis and 
forecasting.  This is a reality of the US system in which administrations tend to think in 
timeframes that coincide with election cycles.  Because of this, intelligence priorities are 
more likely to be focused on the immediate issues, and less likely to prioritize issues that 
are simply budding or simmering.  Loch argues for the value of both current and long 
term analysis, although he notes that policy makers clearly prefer current intelligence.19  
Lowenthal leans towards current analysis, warning that as analysis ranges beyond a few 
years, its accuracy is likely to decrease.  He also notes that policy makers are far less 
concerned about long-term issues.20  Betts too warns that a lack of long-term analysis 
puts unfair constraints on intelligence analysts and hinders their ability to provide what 
they believe to be the best analytical product to help inform policy.21  Treverton has also 
emphasized that long-term analysis is necessary to better understand how new threats 
                                                 
17 Medina, “What to do When Intelligence Models Fail,” in Intelligence and The National Security 
Strategist, ed. Roger Z. George and Robert D. Kline (Washington, DC, National Defense University Press, 
2004), p. 423. 
18 Stephen, Marrin, “Why Intelligence Analysis has Limited Influence on American Foreign Policy,” APSA 
2014 Annual Meeting Paper, 2014, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2451923. 
19 Johnson, National Security Intelligence, p. 66-67. 
20 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, p. 154. 
21 Richard K. Betts, “Fixing Intelligence,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81 No. 1, Jan/Feb, 2002, 50. 
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arise in a globalized world.22  Regardless of its specific mission, such as attempting to 
forecast a long-term issue or answering an immediate question, at its core, intelligence 
analysis is intended to use objective information to provide clarity to the policy maker on 
complex issues in order to inform decision-making.   
 The existing literature in the field of intelligence studies has presented clarity on 
several key understandings of the role intelligence analysis is supposed to fill for the 
executive.  First, intelligence analysis plays a key role in the intelligence cycle, bridging 
the gap between collection and raw data and presenting an intelligible assessment of the 
information to the policy maker.  Second, intelligence analysis is meant to aid in the 
policy making process, largely by providing insight in situations of great uncertainty.  
Lastly, the role for intelligence analysis may change over time and between 
administrations due to external factors.  The existing scholarship is pessimistic and posits 
that intelligence has never truly been able to influence policy, however this is based on 
interpretations from individuals who worked in and around the intelligence community.  
An examination, through a series of case studies, of the intelligence analysis presented to 
the executive regarding countries where the US enacted regime change during the Cold 
War, will provide evidence of whether intelligence played a role in influencing US 
policy. 
Theory and Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this paper is that intelligence analysis had little influence on 
policy making during the Cold War.  The hypothesis is informed by several theories.  The 
                                                 
22 Gregory F. Treverton and Jeremy J. Ghez, Rand Corporation Conference Proceedings Series, Making 





first of which is that the definitions of intelligence already discussed – as a tool to inform 
policy – are idealistic.  In reality, as discussed in the writings of both Helgerson and 
Priess, each President acts as the ultimate decision maker, reserving their right to disagree 
with any analysis presented to them.23  Furthermore, each President holds his or her own 
view of the intelligence community and decide its ultimate role in the administration.  As 
such, any analysis presented to the executive can be either completely cast aside or taken 
into complete consideration.  Another theory that informs this hypothesis is that at the 
time of these cases, the West was so gripped by the fear of Communism that if 
intelligence analysis assessed a country to have even the slightest possibility of 
Communist leanings or minimal interactions with the USSR – even if the assessment was 
that the country was not at risk of falling under the proverbial iron curtain – it is possible 
that this was enough justification in the eyes of a policy maker to enact regime change.  
Lastly, it is well known that there existed other reasons for the US to place more 
favorable regimes in certain countries, such as privately owned economic interests such 
as the United Fruit Company in Guatemala, oil business in Iran, and precious uranium 
resources in the Congo.  It must be considered that even if intelligence analysis was 
informing the executive that these interests were not immediately at risk, the policy 
choices made may have been attempts at proactively securing them.  By specifically 
examining the intelligence analysis provided to the executive in instances where regime 
change was enacted, this paper will set out to determine if intelligence analysis effected 
                                                 
23 John L. Helgerson, Getting to Know the President: Intelligence Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 
1952-2004, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence) Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2012; and David Priess, The President's Book of Secrets: The Untold Story of Intelligence 




such policy decisions and outcomes through assessments in the analysis that provided 
cause for the Presidential administrations to enact regime change.   
Methods 
In order to answer the research question, a series of case studies was undertaken.  
This study is a controlled comparison design as it uses case studies that provide examples 
in which regime change was the chosen policy, and the comparison will be of the data – 
i.e. the intelligence analysis – that did or did not support the policy outcome.  In this 
research design, the intelligence analysis is the independent variable, as the question is 
whether or not the analysis (x), had any impact on the policy to enact regime change (y).  
The data used in this research design is historical and archival in focus.  Primarily, 
analytical products from the intelligence community that were presented to the executive 
in each case were chosen, including (but not limited to): National Intelligence Estimates 
(NIE); Presidential Daily Briefings (PDB, also called “The President’s Intelligence 
Checklist,”); high-level CIA memos; high level State Department documents, particularly 
those involving assessments from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).24   
Operationalizing the independent variable was contingent upon the understanding 
that the US policy of enacting regime change was justified by the engrained Cold War 
rhetoric that Communism was a threat to US interests, domestic and foreign.  Therefore, 
intelligence analysis  (in this study) was measured in its effects on influencing policy by 
several factors, the first of which being that it preceded the formal policy decision to 
enact regime change.  Additionally, the intelligence analysis had to express at least one of 
the following assessments with confidence: the regime in a foreign country posed a threat 
                                                 
24 The term “executive” in this paper refers to: the President, the National Security Council or any of its 




to the US; the regime in a foreign country was imminently at risk of falling under the 
influence of Communism/USSR (or had already fallen under); any alternative to the 
current regime would be more favorable to US interests; an explicit identification of a 
party within a foreign country that should be supported by the US in any way, in hopes 
that it could replace the current regime.  If the evidence met any of these measures, it was 
considered likely to have influenced policy, as each data would have been presented to 
the executive.  The dependent variable, the policy to enact regime change, is inherently 
measured, as each case is a verified instance in which the US attempted regime change in 
a foreign country.  The exception to this is the case study of Iran in 1953, which acts as a 
counter to confirmation bias on the part of the researcher.  The case was examined across 
two administrations that were presented with the option to enact regime change.  In this 
case, two presidents worked with similar intelligence analysis on the same issue and 
made different policy decisions, therefore showing that despite a positive or negative 
hypothesis about the influence of intelligence analysis on policy, there is an example to 
counteract it.   
The case studies in this paper were chosen because they are recognized instances 
in which the US chose to enact regime change in a foreign country.  Moreover, these 
cases cover three presidential administrations and have enough declassified material to 
provide an opportunity for thorough analysis.  The hypothesis formed when approaching 
this research is that intelligence analysis had little influence on policy-making.  Evidence 
that contradicts this hypothesis is the easiest to identify.  For example, an NIE that 
assessed a high risk to US national interests from a foreign regime preceding a US 
backed coup in said country would be directly refuting the hypothesis.  Evidence that 
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supports the hypothesis is less straightforward.  A complete survey of analytical 
intelligence products regarding the political situation of one country is not a realistic 
undertaking due to both the breadth of information as well as the likely classification of 
documents. Therefore, any absence of negative evidence cannot be taken as a complete 
answer.  Moreover, as geopolitical situations are often unclear, there may be instances in 
which the intelligence analysis does not provide a high level of confidence in its 
assessments.  The most unambiguous example of evidence supporting the hypothesis is 
analysis that plainly assessed no reason to believe that a regime was imminently at risk of 
falling under Communist/USSR influence or that a homegrown Communist movement 
was threatening US interests.  Additionally, intelligence analysis that assessed that there 
were options for allying with or negotiating with a regime that was being considered for 




 The case of the 1953 Iranian Coup d’état was examined across the Truman and 
Eisenhower administrations.  During the Truman administration, Iran was rife with 
political turmoil.  Embroiled in a dispute over Iranian oil, the British sought US 
assistance, proposing a coup as a possible course of action.25  Truman left office in the 
beginning of 1953, having never given approval for the coup plan.  In 1953, the 
Eisenhower administration made a decision to stage a coup in Iran in order to overthrow 
the democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammed Mosadeq.  This particular 
example of regime change will functionally serve as two case studies, with the Truman 
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administration serving as a counter to confirmation bias on the part of the researcher, as 
two administrations with overlapping data made opposite policy decisions.  This case 
examines the intelligence analysis provided to the executive from the years 1950-1953 
primarily in the form intelligence estimates. 
In July of 1950, a CIA Special Evaluation assessed that the USSR was unlikely to 
attack Iran, although it seemed probable that other clandestine efforts would be 
increased.26  A National Intelligence Estimate from December of that year similarly 
evaluated that the USSR had no plans to directly invade Iran.27  As we see in these 
documents, there was analysis that the USSR was attempting to exert influence in Iran, 
but no assessment of any immediate threat to US interests.  Moving forward into 1951, 
there was an increase in nationalist fervor in Iran, as well as a push for the nationalization 
of Iranian oil.  As a result, we see a greater focus in the intelligence assessments during 
that time on the possibility of the USSR asserting influence in Iran. 
A Special Estimate dated March 18, 1951 looked to address the “Current Crisis in 
Iran,” referring to the political instability following the assassination of the Prime 
Minister Haj Ali Razmara on March 7.  The document stated, “We do not believe, 
however, that the situation is such that there is imminent danger of the government’s 
losing control, barring armed intervention by the USSR.”  The authors went on to explain 
that “The illegal pro-Soviet Tudeh Party is not believed to be capable of taking advantage 
of the current tension to gain control of the government or even seriously to disrupt the 
                                                 
26 CIA, Special Evaluation No. 39, “Possibility of Soviet Aggression Against Iran,” 27 July 1950, CIA 
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government’s control.”28  An NIE published in April 1951 entitled “Iran’s Position in the 
East-West Conflict,” similarly assessed that the USSR would not take overt military 
action in Iran.29  However, this estimate noted that while “Most Iranians are better 
disposed toward the West than towards the USSR,” this relationship was threatened by 
Iran’s vulnerability should the USSR attack.30  Regarding the Communist Tudeh Party in 
Iran, the analysis did not present any fears of the party taking power, owing to their 
illegal status at the time.31  While the political turmoil and oil crisis in Iran did cause US 
interest in Iran to spike, the intelligence analysis still did not present any immediate threat 
of the country falling to Communism. 
Mossadeq ascended to office in 1952, and intelligence analysis began to acutely 
focus on his activities.  A CIA Special Estimate from October 1952 specifically 
addressed the prospects for Mossadeq’s “regime.”  The estimate first assessed that the 
Mossadeq government would survive for at least six months, and went on to say that the 
Tudeh were almost certainly unable to overthrow the government, and no other attempts 
at overthrow from other groups were likely.  The estimate also raised the issue of Mullah 
Kashani, an “ambitious Moslem leader,” rising to power.  In fact, the estimate stated that 
Kashani rising to power would be a “situation worse for Western interests than the 
current one,” as this would possibly lead to the rise of the Tudeh.32  The assessment on 
the probability of Kashani usurping Mossadeq, however, was low.  By the end of 1952, a 
US National Intelligence Estimate projecting through 1953 (as Eisenhower would be 
                                                 
28 CIA, “Special Estimate: The Current Crisis in Iran,” SE-3, March 16, 1951, CIA FOIA Reading Room, 
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assuming office) illustrated US fears that as an agitator to the political situation in Iran, 
the Tudeh party was a growing threat.  However, the report noted that the group was still 
likely incapable of carrying out a coup on their own.33  Thus, the Truman administration 
came to an end without enacting regime change in Iran.   
President Eisenhower assumed office in January 1953, abreast of the same 
intelligence analysis regarding the situation in Iran that Truman had received over the 
past year.34  An intelligence estimate disseminated during Eisenhower’s first days in 
office did offer a heightened sense of worry about Communist factions’ growing in Iran.  
However, it still noted that a breakdown of authority “appears unlikely during 1953,” 
(though it does not make this assessment with the same high confidence of the analysis 
from late 1952).35  Eisenhower formally approved the coup in July 1953, though planning 
had been underway for months before then.  In examining the complete data set for this 
case, there were no assessments that USSR influence or homegrown Communism in Iran 
posed an imminent threat to US interests.  This statement is true for both the Truman and 
Eisenhower administrations.  Thus, considering the Truman administration as one case, 
we see evidence against the hypothesis; for the second case, we see evidence for the 
hypothesis, that intelligence analysis did not influence the eventual policy decision. 
Guatemala 
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The 1954 Guatemalan coup d’etat will serve as the next case.  Similarly to the 
case of Iran (1953), this situation crossed two presidential administrations.  Guatemalan 
President Jacobo Arbenz assumed office in 1951, and immediately the Truman 
administration suspected that the USSR was attempting to meddle in the country’s affairs 
and establish a foothold in the Western hemisphere.36  Truman authorized plans for a 
coup to oust Arbenz, however this plan was eventually aborted.  Eisenhower authorized 
the next coup attempt in August 1953, and Arbenz eventually resigned in the face of US 
backed opposition forces on June 27, 1954.  For this case, we will examine mainly data 
from the Eisenhower administration, with one exception: an NIE from March 1952 
projecting through the end of the year, when the administration would change.  This NIE 
assessed that Communist forces in Guatemala were exercising political strength with 
significant success, but also noted the unlikelihood of Communists assuming power in 
1952.37  Despite this particular piece of analysis, the estimate detailed numerous other 
worries about the growth of Communism in Guatemala, particularly in the government 
(the document notes that Arbenz’s immediate successor was a pro-communist).  As the 
Eisenhower administration took office, assessments of the Communist threat grew 
starker.     
In response to the dissemination of NIE-70 (published in December, 1952 and 
disseminated in February of the following year), the American Embassy in Guatemala 
City sent a memorandum of “field comments,” to the Director of the State Department’s 
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Intelligence Bureau.  In this letter, the Ambassador to Guatemala Rudolf Schoenfeld 
warned that the Communist elements within Guatemala may have been underestimated in 
NIE-70 (which spoke to Communism in Latin America on a grander scale), and had in 
fact successfully infiltrated the government and were able to influence policy in the 
country.38  An intelligence report produced by the Department of State INR in March 
1953 also provided a grim outlook regarding the spread of Communism in Guatemala.  
Specifically addressing the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law by the Arbenz 
administration, the intelligence report listed numerous advantages for Communists if the 
law were to be fully implemented.  Moreover, the report noted the success that 
Communist forces within the country already had in influencing the government and 
populace in Guatemala.39  Lastly, the report stated that, “With the assistance of the 
Communists, who will take advantage of the opportunity to extend their influence over 
the rural classes, a stronger backing for the government should result.”40  These reports of 
Communism in Guatemala were increasing, and analysis would only become more 
alarming in the coming months. 
In a CIA report from March 1953, the analysis stated that Communism spreading 
in Guatemala was a foregone conclusion, and went on to assess that “The fact that so 
many communists in high places in the Guatemalan government are on such friendly 
terms with Russia, makes it clear that under their leadership Guatemala will side with the 
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Soviet [sic] in case of an armed conflict.”41  The report went on to list evidence of 
Communist success in Guatemala, including control of the “Official Press” and presence 
in high government positions.42  NIE-84 (May 1953) assessed the threat of Communism 
taking hold in Guatemala as imminent.  The estimate unambiguously stated, “The current 
political situation in Guatemala is adverse to US interests. The Guatemalan Communists 
exercise a political influence far out of proportion to their small numerical strength.  
Their influence will probably continue to grow as long as President Arbenz remains in 
power.”43  This NIE contains the most explicit example of evidence (in this case) that 
intelligence analysis regarding Guatemala did support the eventual policy decision to 
enact regime change.  The assessment not only expounded the Communist influence 
within the Guatemalan government and greater populace, but also cast doubts on any 
viable anti-communist efforts that could present an alternative to Arbenz.  The final 
conclusion of NIE-84 stated: “the regime has systematically been hostile toward US 
private economic interests in Guatemala.”44  As seen in the data presented, the 
intelligence analysis given to the executive regarding Guatemala indicated legitimate 
fears that the country was essentially lost to Communists under Arbenz. 
Republic of the Congo 
The fourth case in this study is that of the Republic of the Congo in 1960.  The 
Republic of the Congo achieved independence in June 1960, and Patrice Lumumba was 
elected Prime Minister the same month.  In the political turmoil that ensued, the 
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intelligence apparatus of the United States acted quickly to assess the situation and try to 
identify the key players and possible outcomes.  Immediately after Lumumba’s 
assumption of office, the CIA assessed him to be a threat to US interests.  In an NSC 
intelligence briefing on July 25, 1960, the assessment that “Congo’s position appears to 
be moving toward Soviet-oriented neutralism,” was presented to the council.45  
Interestingly, a memorandum also dated July 25 from the director of the INR Bureau to 
Secretary of State Herter stressed that reports of Communist influence in the Congo may 
have been unfounded.46  At the onset of the “Congo Crisis,” as it came to be called, the 
various intelligence collecting agencies did not necessarily agree in their assessments of 
Lumumba and Communist influence in the Congo.  As time progressed, however, the 
reports coming from US assets in the Congo grew more alarming. 
A cable from the CIA station in Leopodville to the CIA on August 11 stated that 
the “Embassy and Station believe Lumumba moving left and Commie influence 
increasing [sic].”  The cable went on to say, “Thus believe fall Lumumba would assist 
Western objectives [sic].”47 A CIA “Current Intelligence Weekly Summary” from August 
18 assessed that Lumumba was relying on the USSR for political support in dealings with 
the UN in his country, calling the USSR “Lumumba’s firmest outside supporter.”48  In a 
Memorandum from the Board of National Estimates to the Director of Central 
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Intelligence on August 22, it was judged that the USSR appeared “to be developing a 
considerable stake in Lumumba.”  The report assessed that Lumumba was likely to 
remain in office and concluded the following: 
Thus, the crisis will achieve one of the important Soviet objectives in the area, to 
end the political and economic dominance of the Western powers over what is in 
terms of resources one of the richest areas in Africa. The USSR will also have 
substantial opportunities for developing its own influence and moulding the state 
and economy along radical lines, particularly if Lumumba remains in power.49 
 
Influenced by the intelligence analysis regarding Lumumba and his ties to the 
government, it was directed on August 27 that Lumumba’s “removal must be an urgent 
and prime objective and that under existing conditions this should be a high priority of 
our covert action.”50  Lumumba was removed from office after forces backed by the US 
staged a coup d’état and deposed the Prime Minister.  In the case of Lumumba and the 
Republic of the Congo, it appears that the majority of evidence examined did in fact 
support the policy decision to enact regime change, although there were initially 
conflicting reports. 
Brazil 
 The final case in this study is the 1964 Brazilian coup d’état, which ended in the 
overthrow of President João Goulart on April 1, 1964.  Goulart’s presidency was 
followed closely by the US, wary of Communist influence in Latin America after the 
events in Cuba in 1961.  A Special NIE published in December 1961 (only months after 
Goulart took office) assessed the prospects of a Goulart administration through October 
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1962.  While the NIE noted Goulart’s Communist sympathies and the presence of 
avowed Communists in high government posts, it is also stated that “it is unlikely that 
Communist infiltration of the government will go so far as to give the Communist Party a 
significant influence on the formulation and execution of policy within the period of time 
of this estimate.”51  Here, the initial assessment of Goulart described him as problematic, 
but not a high threat to any US interests.  Another Special NIE from February 1963 
presented similar views.  The estimate again noted that Goulart had known associations 
with Communists, but stated “there is little reason to believe that he is dedicated to a 
radical transformation of Brazilian society or to a radical reorientation of Brazil’s foreign 
policy.”52  The authors also said that Goulart kept moderates among his advisers as well.  
At this juncture, Goulart, though known to have ties to Communism, was not seen as a 
major threat likely to lead his country to make strong ties with the USSR.  The worries 
about the growth of Communist factions in Brazil, however, continued to develop, and 
the intelligence agencies kept a close eye on their activities. 
 Examination of intelligence analysis in 1963 shows how closely the US was 
following developments in Brazil.  The President’s Daily Checklist (PDB) from April 4, 
1963 noted that Communists were in a strong position to take control of labor 
organizations in Brazil.53  A PDB on September 27 described strong “leftist” pressures 
being placed on Goulart to remove an ardent anti-communist from a high ranking 
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military post, though it also assessed that Goulart would likely not do so.54  As the 
political situation heated up in March 1964, a PDB assessed that leftist support was 
“coalescing” behind Goulart as the President attempted to push radical reforms through 
congress.55  Brazil descended into political chaos as anti-Goulart groups banded together 
in attempts to oust him.  As described in the PDB from March 30, it was then “evident 
that Brazil’s clamorous left-wing gained ground from last week’s bizarre episode,” going 
on to say “personnel changes made by Goulart after the incident are described by 
Embassy Rio as ‘Gifts to the leftists.’”56  Before being cut off by redaction, a PDB from 
March 31 stated “All this plays into Communist Hands,” when detailing the actions of 
Goulart in the middle of the political crisis.57  On that same day, President Johnson 
authorized officials to move military assets in order to support Brazilian forces 
attempting to overthrow Goulart.58  In this case, there is evidence that intelligence 
analysis reported ties of Goulart to known Communists, but did not assess it as a major 
threat to US interests.  Moreover, we do not see any analysis that there were more 
favorable alternatives to Goulart.  
Discussion 
After undertaking the series of case studies, the hypothesis that intelligence 
analysis had little influence on policy making during the Cold War was proven incorrect.  
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In the majority of cases, the intelligence analysis presented to the executive was largely 
in line with the ultimate policy outcome.  Based on the understanding of the intelligence 
cycle established in the literature review, this demonstrates that intelligence analysis was 
likely able to have influenced policy making in these instances.   
In the case of Iran (1953), there is a lack of availability in data between January 
and July 1953; therefore we are left to believe that Eisenhower was utilizing the 
intelligence analysis already provided in the end of the Truman administration.  Working 
under this assumption, we see that two presidents, presented with the same intelligence 
analysis, chose different policies.  During the Truman administration, given the 
assessment that Iran was not under imminent threat of Communism, a policy of enacting 
regime change, though considered, was not undertaken.  This proves as evidence against 
the original hypothesis.  In the case of Iran during the Eisenhower administration, none of 
the data available meets any of the measures set for proving that the analysis informed 
the policy decision to enact regime change during the Eisenhower administration, thus 
serving as evidence for the hypothesis.   
The case of Guatemala (1954) stands in contrast to that of Iran under the 
Eisenhower administration.  There were assessments of high confidence that the Arbenz 
regime posed a threat to US interests, was already under Communist influence, and that 
there were few, if any, alternatives to Arbenz that would be able to ascend without US 
assistance.  Thus, the data examined in this case demonstrates evidence against the 
hypothesis – the intelligence analysis may in fact have influenced the policy decision to 
enact regime change in Guatemala.  The same can be said for the fourth case, the 
Republic of the Congo in 1960.  Although there were at first differing opinions on the 
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threat posed by Lumumba from the State Department and CIA, any disagreements were 
resolved, as seen in the memorandum from the head of the Board of National Estimates 
to the head of the CIA.59  Not only was Lumumba seen as a threat to US interests, other 
parties within the country were identified as favorable alternatives. In each of these cases, 
the ties of the regimes in power to Communism were assessed with high confidence in 
the intelligence analysis.  These are the clearest examples of intelligence analysis 
assessing the regimes in power as a threat to US interests. 
The case of Brazil is perhaps the least clear.  In the intelligence analysis 
examined, there are clear indications that Goulart appointed Communists to high posts in 
his government (similar to the analysis on Guatemala), but the assessments expressed no 
alarm at this, as Goulart was not believed to be loyal to any political ideology.60  
Moreover, none of the data presented any fears that Brazil would imminently fall to 
Communism.  It was not until the month leading up to the eventual coup that the 
intelligence analysis regarding Goulart showed a heightened sense of worry.  In this 
regard, the intelligence analysis did present concerns that the Communists held strength 
beyond their numbers and may have been able to begin exerting political influence.  This 
analysis must be taken as evidence against the hypothesis.  Unfortunately for this study, 
much of the data still suffers from heavy redaction.  It is possible that the analysis offered 
assessments of alternatives to the Goulart regime that the US could have supported to 
usurp him in the time of political turmoil, providing another means to measure the data.  
However, this is only speculation.  What seems to have ultimately pushed the decision to 
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oust Goulart was an extensive cable from the US Ambassador in Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, 
to the Secretary of State, Director of the CIA, and the Secretary of Defense (among 
others) assessing the political crisis in Brazil.  In this cable, dated March 28, 1964, the 
Ambassador explicitly states his belief that Goulart had strong ties to Communism and 
posed a threat to US interests.  Ambassador Gordon suggested a number of means for the 
US to support the anti-Goulart forces, naming Brazilian General Branco as a competent, 
trustworthy leader to support in the effort.61  This cable, however, was not used as data in 
this study because it is not a finished intelligence analysis product.  It did not undergo the 
full intelligence cycle, as did the other data used in this study.62  In summation, because 
there were indications in the intelligence analysis in the final days before Goulart was 
deposed that Communist factions were indeed liable to oust the President, enough of the 
data met the measures set for this study as evidence against the hypothesis.  Thus, the 
case of Brazil is ultimately evidence against the hypothesis. 
The initial hypothesis, that intelligence analysis had little ability to influence 
policy, appears to be unsupported.  The majority of evidence in this research shows that 
intelligence analysis met the measures set to demonstrate that it aligned with, and 
therefore likely informed the policy decision to enact regime change.  This finding does 
not discredit the theories that led to the hypothesis.  The theory that the US was so 
gripped by the fear of Communism remains true, and intelligence analysts and policy 
makers may have been poised to see regimes with leftist sympathies as more at risk of 
falling under Communist influence than they were in reality.  This can be seen in the case 
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of Brazilian President Goulart, who was known to make political ties largely for self-
serving purposes, not for ideological reasons.  This was the assessment of much of the 
data studied in the years preceding the coup, but these assessments were cast aside when 
Goulart turned to the Brazilian Communist Party for support in the face of a coup (before 
the US officially sent support for the anti-Goulart forces).   
The hypothesis was correct in one instance, the case of Iran (1953) under the 
Eisenhower administration.  While clearly there were worries that Mossadeq may turn to 
the Tudeh (Communist) Party for support, there was no piece of evidence that assessed 
with confidence that any ties had actually been made.  While intelligence analysis did not 
meet the measures set for proving it informed policy, it was in fact the tone of advisors 
close to Eisenhower that strongly influenced his decision-making regarding the 
Communist threat in Iran.  John Foster Dulles (Secretary of State) admitted to 
hyperbolizing the threat of communism to Eisenhower.63  Additionally, a Tudeh Party 
specialist at the time of the coup reported that high-level US officials “routinely 
exaggerated [the Tudeh’s] strength and Mosadeq’s reliance on it.”64  This information 
supports the theory that at times, policymakers may ignore or reject intelligence analysis 
that doesn’t support their views or their own analysis.65 
In most of the cases, intelligence analysis presented to the executive shows high 
correlation with the ultimate policy outcome.  This research adds a layer of depth to the 
scholarly work done in the field of Cold War political history as it provides an 
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assessment of the analysis policy makers were provided with regarding regimes that were 
determined averse to US interests at the time. The findings also interact with one of the 
few comprehensive works regarding the question of intelligence analysis’ ability to 
impact policymaking, advanced by former CIA analyst Stephen Marrin.66  Marrin 
contends that strategic intelligence analysis has little ability to influence policy, and 
further suggests that there is too high an expectation (informed by the standard model of 
the intelligence cycle) from scholars that it should. Among other reasons, Marrin posits 
that policymakers often perform the analysis function on their own and find intelligence 
analysis from agencies as duplicative or unnecessary – they only want the raw 
information.  Marrin’s thesis and underlying theories may explain why, in the case of 
Iran, Eisenhower chose to enact regime change when the strategic intelligence did not 
support such an action.  However, the other cases in this paper provide some evidence 
against Marrin’s central hypothesis and warrant further examination to determine why 
policymakers accepted this intelligence, and if they had a tendency to reject at other 
times.  Much of Marrin’s supporting evidence comes from the Vietnam War and after, 
and further analysis should be conducted to determine if the patterns of disconnect that 
Marrin cites existed prior to that time period. 
The conclusions reached open the door for further research on the subject, 
perhaps conducting more case studies on other instances where the US enacted regime 
change in foreign countries. The scope of this paper presented an opportunity to study the 
effects of intelligence analysis on only one identifiable Cold War policy, regime change, 
which became very common during the Cold War after the first successful US backed 
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coup that ousted Mosadeq.  The conclusions reached are a valuable addition to the field 
of intelligence studies, as they address a question that was identified as under-researched, 
yet vitally important.  There is also an opportunity to study whether intelligence is able to 
inform other policies, an effort that would be another significant addition to the field of 
intelligence studies. A study following the same research design but expanded beyond 
this particular Cold War policy would have implications for improving intelligence 
analysis to better inform policy makers, thus improving the intelligence cycle. 
Conclusion 
This paper set out to answer the question of how (US) intelligence analysis 
influenced the Cold War policy of enacting regime change in foreign countries.  In this 
endeavor, it was determined that the purpose of intelligence analysis is to inform the 
policy maker of threats to national security, and assess what level of risk these threats 
pose.  With this information, a study was undertaken to determine whether intelligence 
analysis did in fact provide reason for the policy makers to believe that enacting regime 
change was necessary to protect US interests.  A hypothesis was formed that intelligence 
analysis had little ability to influence policy.  After comparing case studies of countries 
where regime change took place, this hypothesis was proven incorrect.  The majority of 
intelligence analysis on countries where a regime was deposed by a US backed effort 
provided assessments that the regime in question was under imminent threat of falling to 
Communism, was already linked to Communism, or directly threatened US interests.  
However, the case of the 1953 Iranian Coup d’état under the Eisenhower administration 
did fall in line with the hypothesis, as none of the measures set for proving that 
intelligence analysis did inform policy were met.   
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This study has demonstrated that during the Cold War, intelligence analysis 
appears likely to have influenced the policy to enact regime change in foreign countries.  
This conclusion, however, is limited to only the case studies undertaken.  As there was 
not an overwhelming majority of evidence, a larger study should be conducted.  
Unfortunately, due to the nature of the subject, much of the data for other potential cases 
where the US enacted regime change remains classified.  It would also be useful to 
supplement this study with another that assesses each President’s relationship with the 
intelligence apparatus conducting analysis. By conducting broader research on the 
interaction between the national security policy-making apparatus (including the 
president) and the intelligence analysis presented to it, the conclusions in this paper will 
be strengthened as data of direct influence on policy making may be determined.  
Because this research paper was limited in its scope and length, a larger research effort 
was unfeasible.  The conclusions reached in this paper, however, still stand.  Intelligence 
analysis during the Cold War was largely consistent with the enacted policy decisions in 





Chapter 2: The Development of Violent Non-State Actors’ 
Intelligence Functions 
Introduction 
 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the study of non-
state actors and their role in the international order gained traction.  While non-state 
actors have long been present, the rise of globalization thrust them into the fore of 
academic research on international security. 67 This is evidenced by the broad literature 
examining the role of non-governmental organizations (NGO), multi-national 
corporations (MNC), and international organizations (IO).   
Concurrent with this academic trend was the emergence of violent non-state 
actors (VNSA) as key international players.  As globalization increased and fears about 
the diminishing strength of the traditional state rose, VNSAs usurping power in areas of 
weak governments has received increased international attention.68 While there is a 
substantial literature on these groups and their rise to prominence, it is often regionally 
focused and mostly fixated on how best to combat them.  This paper seeks to fill a gap in 
the existing literature, specifically examining VNSA’s intelligence functions and how 
they have developed over the past two decades. 
The term “intelligence functions” refers to any intelligence activities of VNSAs 
that closely resemble those of sovereign states, such as the activities of the intelligence 
community in the United States.  These activities include intelligence collection and 
analysis for the purpose of avoiding strategic surprise, providing long-term expertise, 
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maintaining internal security (counterintelligence or CI), military intelligence, and 
carrying out covert action.69  The timeline to be studied is important because of the 
increased role VNSAs have played in international relations during this time and because 
of the proliferation of technology previously available only to governments.  For 
example, increased global Internet availability allows for unrestricted access to 
commercial imagery, provides encrypted communications, and creates other means for 
open source intelligence activities.  These developments may have had a distinct impact 
on VNSAs’ ability to undertake intelligence activities, but the question remains 
unexamined.  Tracking these developments are key to expanding our understanding of 
VNSAs and may point to the reason why some have survived for such long durations.  
Moreover, understanding the intelligence functions of VNSAs today will highlight how 
they focus their efforts both internally and externally. 
The first section of this paper examines the definition and implementation of 
intelligence as seen by state actors, the intelligence functions of various VNSAs prior to 
the timeline examined, and outlines key developments in intelligence functions for state 
actors that we may expect to see from VNSAs.  A series of case studies follows, focusing 
on the intelligence functions of three groups: Al Qaeda, Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL), and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). The final section 
summarizes the key findings of this study and discusses implications for further research. 
Literature Review 
 In order to understand the intelligence function of non-state actors, the concept of 
intelligence must first be defined.  There is no single, widely accepted definition of 
                                                 




intelligence, but key concepts of intelligence are well established in the field of 
intelligence studies.  With slight variations in the definitions in some sources, intelligence 
serves to provide policy makers with information to warn about current threats.  
Intelligence can then inform decision-making and aid the policy process.70  To achieve 
these functions, state intelligence agencies carry out core activities: internal security; 
collection; analysis, counterintelligence; and covert action.71  Therefore, the intelligence 
functions of VNSAs are defined as activities carried out by VNSAs that mirror those of 
states’ intelligence agencies.  The history of insurgent groups prior to the past two 
decades shows certain parallels between VNSAs and states’ intelligence activities, and 
also highlights key differences. 
 Prior to the end of the Cold War, literature on VNSAs is limited. When it does 
exist, studies are largely focused on insurgent groups fighting against colonial rule, with 
some VNSAs succeeding to achieve statehood or semi-statehood.72  Nonetheless, older 
examples of guerrilla and insurgent groups undertaking intelligence activities exist.  
Human intelligence, signals intelligence (SIGINT), counterintelligence, and even covert 
actions (including propaganda) have been used by VNSAs throughout history.  
Understanding the historical application of these activities by VNSAs will help to inform 
the ways in which their intelligence activities have developed over the past two decades. 
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Human intelligence (HUMINT)—the collection of information from human 
sources—is one of the most pervasive intelligence activities used by VNSAs.73  VNSAs 
have used HUMINT as a central piece of their intelligence activities partly because it is a 
cheap and effective means of collecting information. HUMINT can serve a number of 
purposes, with agents of an insurgent force acting as informants, watchmen, 
cartographers, and even local guides.74  Some VNSAs have even penetrated the states 
they are fighting against with human agents, including in the case of the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA).75  The prevalence of HUMINT among VNSAs can likely be 
attributed to its low cost and simplicity relative to technical means of intelligence 
collection. Additionally, many VNSAs are formed around a certain ideology, with 
sympathizers bound to exist somewhere in the general population that the VNSA is 
operating in.  These willing agents may offer their services to the cause of the VNSA, or 
alternatively non-willing individuals may be forced to comply out of necessity or fear.76   
In addition to an extensive HUMINT apparatus, the PIRA was known to conduct 
SIGINT collection on the British security forces, utilizing off-the-shelf technology to 
identify and intercept radio communications of British security forces.77  However, this 
sophisticated means of collection was not used extensively by VNSAs.78  It is costly, 
technologically sophisticated, and not especially useful for those VNSAs that operate 
over larger areas.  It is more pertinent for these groups to subvert the SIGINT collection 
of their adversaries, a key aspect of VNSA counterintelligence measures. 
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Counterintelligence is perhaps the paramount intelligence function of VNSAs, 
and has even been considered the most important intelligence activity for their survival.79  
States’ counterintelligence activities are aimed at protecting internal intelligence 
operations from hostile nations. This role is often assumed by law enforcement or other 
domestic security agencies, such as the FBI in the United States or MI5 in the United 
Kingdom.  Some terrorist groups such as the PIRA had dedicated counterintelligence 
officers and units.80  VNSAs have been observed as having an intrinsic 
counterintelligence function, with members instinctively acting as CI officers out of 
necessity for protecting themselves.81  Certain groups have natural CI vetting procedures 
through indoctrination practices, e.g. proving one’s faith in order to join the group.82  
Another important counterintelligence activity is subverting detection, both physically 
and in communications.  VNSAs are known to use code when speaking over the phone or 
in passing written communications, and also to disguise themselves by blending in with 
the local populace when traveling.83  Effective counterintelligence activities are vital to 
the survival of VNSAs, as they are often outmatched by states’ intelligence capabilities. 
 Covert action is another intelligence activity that is traditionally utilized by 
VNSAs, though often on a smaller scale than that of state actors.  Covert actions (CA) are 
defined as activities that are designed to influence “political, economic or military 
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conditions abroad.”84  CAs undertaken by states are also intended to be non-attributable 
or at least provide a layer of plausible deniability.85  For VNSAs, the most prevalent form 
of CAs for VNSAs is propaganda campaigns, which can be knowingly or unknowingly 
directed by the VNSA.  For insurgents or guerrillas fomenting insurrection, waging a 
propaganda war is a central component of any effort.86 Mao Tse-tung was well known for 
his use of propaganda during his guerrilla campaign against the Kuomintang, among 
other intelligence activities.  Guerrillas and insurgents seeking to ingratiate themselves 
with the local populace do so by propagandizing, convincing the civilians and perhaps 
even elements within their adversary’s forces that the enemy’s cause is unjust.87  Mao 
also provides us with an example of a covert action on a much larger scale—the guerrilla 
leader at one point pledged his Communist forces’ allegiance to the enemy, only to use 
the funds and materiel received in return to prepare for later battles when the alliance 
broke down.88  Larger scale CAs typically undertaken by states’ intelligence agencies 
such as enacting or instigating coups and conducting economic warfare are not typically 
seen in the activities of VNSAs.89 
The major differences between the intelligence activities of states and VNSAs are 
important.  First, VNSAs often exhibit a lack of intelligence analysis.  The analytical 
function of a state’s intelligence activities is often very robust and vitally important.  
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Collected intelligence goes through a rigorous process before it is ultimately presented to 
policy makers, and it provides an extra layer of value to the recipient through its 
timeliness, contextual information, added insights and estimative information. The 
analytical function is performed by scores of individual analysts who are subject matter 
experts and have dedicated their professional careers to their practice.90  This particular 
function of a state’s intelligence apparatus is likely difficult to replicate for a stateless 
actor who claims a weaker budget and a far smaller population to draw analysts from.  
Second, singular leaders or small leadership groups often lead VNSAs with their 
own strategic vision, thereby removing the need for strategic and estimative intelligence 
aimed to inform the policy maker (as seen in state actors).91  When motivated by religious 
ideology, however, VNSAs may remove the need for strategic intelligence altogether.92  
Though a recent trend for state actors has been to focus on current over estimative 
intelligence, states intelligence agencies still produce long-term intelligence estimates 
that are made available to senior policy makers. The same activities have not been 
observed in the intelligence activities of VNSAs.  The intelligence analysis function of 
states also focuses on a number of issues, meticulously prioritized by complicated 
frameworks intended to maximize effectiveness.93  There is simply no parallel to this 
identified in the literature on VNSAs.   
Examining the major developments in states’ intelligence activities reveals further 
disconnect with VNSAs’ intelligence functions.  Great technological advances made over 
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the past half-century were driven by the needs of states’ intelligence agencies. Major 
technological developments such as remote sensing capabilities and SIGINT collection 
platforms were a sea change for states’ intelligence activities. These advances have led to 
an increased reliance on technology from states that we might not expect from VNSAs 
who have inferior resources.  Expensive collection platforms are often developed or 
subsidized by states that retain sole use of the imagery or any other intelligence collected.  
Large-scale covert actions also require substantial funding.  As technologies such as 
satellites and communications monitoring emerged as means for states’ intelligence 
agencies during the Cold War, VNSAs have not been seen using these methods during 
the same time period because of their high cost.  However, it is unclear at present if the 
recent proliferation of technologies and information such as the Internet, commercial 
satellite imagery, handheld recording devices, or others has led to an increased 
intelligence application on the part of VNSAs.  
Another intelligence activity trend for state actors is the increased use of open 
source intelligence (OSINT).94 Whereas many countries were once considered closed off 
from the world, very few areas today are not open.  Vital intelligence can be collected 
from a number of open sources such as social media and international news outlets 
accessible from anywhere.  The Internet is a trove for open source collection of 
everything from scholarly articles to financial information from large corporations.  
OSINT collection is now a key function for many states’ intelligence agencies, with some 
such as the United States establishing distinct centers for the function.95 
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In defining the intelligence activities of states, it is evident that VNSAs indeed 
exhibit intelligence functions and have historically mirrored some of the intelligence 
activities of states.  There are also significant differences in how states and VNSA’s 
intelligence functions operate.  The gap left to fill in the literature on VNSAs is how their 
intelligence functions have developed over the past two decades, as access to 
technologies once considered exclusive to states has grown. Additionally, it is unclear if 
any developments mirror the trends seen in states’ intelligence functions.  As technology 
has proliferated, we may expect that VNSAs will learn to use what is available to them.  
For example, while a VNSA is unlikely to be able to launch its own satellite, it may make 
use of publicly available imagery for planning operations.  This notion informs the 
hypothesis of this paper: VNSAs intelligence functions have developed over the past two 
decades in a similar way to that of states, but delayed.   
Theory and Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this paper is that VNSAs intelligence functions have developed 
over the past twenty years in a similar way to those of states, only with a delay.  The 
hypothesis is informed by several theories. First, the proliferation of certain technologies 
now allows anyone to collect intelligence in ways that were once exclusive to states 
intelligence agencies (e.g. using a drone for reconnaissance).  Because of this technology 
access, VNSAs may now behave more like states when collecting intelligence. Second, 
as more information becomes available to study the intelligence functions of states via 
open source research, VNSAs may model their own intelligence functions after states’ 
agencies. Similarly, there are instances where individuals trained by state intelligence 
agencies join VNSAs and use their training to help formalize VNSA intelligence 
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functions. By examining more recent examples of VNSA’s uses of intelligence, this 
paper tests this hypothesis to determine if the supporting theories are founded.   
Methods 
To answer the research question, three case studies were undertaken: the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State (ISIL). The 
data used come from a wide variety of sources including newspaper articles; testimony 
by former and current VNSA group members; in-depth research of VNSAs; and any 
available intelligence reporting from state actors.  Measuring the independent variable 
was contingent upon understanding the historical application of intelligence by VNSAs 
or similar groups as established in the literature review.  Therefore, developments in the 
intelligence function of VNSAs were measured in two ways.  First, evidence of the use of 
new technologies or any other means understood to be previously unavailable to VNSAs 
for intelligence activities already practiced by VNSAs is considered a significant 
development.  For example, VNSAs are known to use ciphered notes or code words in 
their communications. A development in this method would be VNSAs using open 
source encryption technology today.   
Second, any evidence of previously unobserved intelligence activities is 
documented.  For example, a VNSA collecting SIGINT when there is no evidence they 
had done so in the past.  Third, developments in VNSAs’ intelligence functions are 
compared to the trends seen in states’ intelligence agencies to see if they align.  Evidence 
against the hypothesis includes a lack of developments in the intelligence functions of 
VNSAs, particularly if the intelligence function existed previously.  Evidence against the 
hypothesis could also include developments that do not mirror the trends seen in the 
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development of states’ agencies.  An example of this could be a complete shunning of 
using technology for intelligence activities. 
The case studies were chosen for several reasons.  There is a substantial body of 
literature on these three VNSAs (the PIRA, Al-Qaeda, ISIL).  However, most mentions 
of VNSA intelligence function is contained in passing references. Therefore, the 
implications are often overlooked.  In the cases where the intelligence function is studied, 
its development is recent and is generally not in-depth.  Because the PIRA is the oldest 
VNSA considered in this chapter, it provides an excellent example of how a single 
VNSA’s intelligence function has adapted over a long time period.  Similarly, Al-Qaeda 
offers a unique perspective as it conducts its operations in a truly global fashion, which 
inherently requires certain intelligence functions such as strong counterintelligence and 
covert communications. ISIL, which traces its roots to Al-Qaeda in Iraq, is known for its 
technological savvy.  Closer examination should reveal just how much the group utilizes 
this savvy for intelligence activities.  Lastly, these are three prominent VNSAs that have 
outlasted many others.  Perhaps this is because of their ability to undertake intelligence 
activities successfully.  Examining their intelligence functions may reveal if this has 
indeed played a role in these groups’ longevity.   
Data 
The following case studies provide any observed developments in the intelligence 
function of the three VNSAs studied—PIRA, Al-Qaeda, and ISIL.  The case studies are 
divided into two sections. First, each case establishes how each entity used to conduct 
intelligence gathering prior to the study period. Second, each case then examines how 
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intelligence functions were developed between 1997 and today.  An analysis of the 
developments or lack of developments will follow in the discussion section. 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was established in 1969 as a 
violent splinter faction of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), a group fighting for the 
unification of all of Ireland and independence from the United Kingdom. Beginning with 
a 1997 ceasefire with the United Kingdom and continuing with the Good Friday 
Agreement of 1998, PIRA decided to lay down its weapons and cease its campaign of 
violence.96  There is evidence, however, of ongoing PIRA intelligence activities prior to 
the completion of the alleged disarmament in 2005.97  Since then, a smaller splinter 
group, the Real IRA (RIRA), has carried out incidents of violence.  Monitoring of the 
RIRA by the British and Irish governments has shown the group’s continued efforts to 
enhance its organizational capabilities and evidence of intelligence activities.   
In the mid-1970s, PIRA underwent an organizational restructuring that formalized 
the group’s intelligence function.  By centralizing leadership and reorganizing its 
intelligence apparatus, PIRA was able to better strategize and prioritize its collection 
efforts as well as standardize the procedures for intelligence activities.98  As a result of 
the reorganization, the PIRA’s intelligence function showed significant improvement.  
Regimented standards and education of new operatives in surveillance methods led to 
operational successes in bombings and assassinations. Improvements in SIGINT 
collection techniques allowed PIRA intelligence teams to monitor police and military 
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radios, even intercepting the phone calls of senior members of the British intelligence 
services.99  HUMINT collection from the populace remained crucial, but PIRA’s 
processing capabilities grew more structured with time and experience, allowing the most 
important intelligence to reach local or central leadership quickly. PIRA was even known 
to utilize open source intelligence collection, including gathering biographical 
information on assassination targets.100  Counterintelligence procedures were also 
strengthened thanks to increased vetting procedures and heightened counterespionage 
efforts.  Moreover, the reorganization of PIRA provided some cover for leadership by 
isolating them from the rank and file. 
Generally, PIRA conducted its intelligence activities in a consistent manner 
between the 1976 restructure until 1997 ceasefire. During this time period, PIRA 
continued to rely heavily on the local populace to collect intelligence and it maintained 
agents in key government offices.101  The organization also continued routine 
surveillance procedures, though targeting capabilities improved.102  Since the ceasefire, 
there is little evidence of significant developments in PIRA’s intelligence function.  
There is evidence, however, that PIRA retained an active intelligence collection system.  
For example, in March 2002, PIRA operatives infiltrated the Castlereagh Special Branch 
headquarters and stole numerous documents and encrypted computer disks that included 
the names and addresses of more than 250 members of the Special Branch, code names of 
informers, and the information they provided to the security services.103  A month later, 
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an IRA database was discovered in Belfast that included details on army bases in Britain 
as well as a list of senior political figures with general details about them (it is believed 
that the list was not informed by the intelligence collected during the Castlereagh break-
in).104  While these incidents do not reveal a dramatic development of PIRA’s 
intelligence function, it does indicate that the group’s intelligence function remained 
active and maintained a certain level of technical competency.  It is also argued the 
continuation of intelligence activities was “a concession to stop hardliners within its 
ranks from joining the splinter group, the Real IRA.”105   
In 1997, RIRA was formed as a dissident group within PIRA, rejecting the 
ceasefire and PIRA’s support of the Good Friday Agreement.106 RIRA unleashed a string 
of violence soon after their formation, including the detonation of a bomb in Omagh, 
Northern Ireland, killing 29 and injuring hundreds. RIRA remains active today, and has 
been observed trying to strengthen its forces and capabilities over the years.  While there 
is little data available on the group, the Independent Monitoring Commission (a group 
established by the British and Irish governments in 2004 in part to monitor the continuing 
activities of paramilitary groups), has noted that in 2009 RIRA “continued to target 
people, primarily members of the security forces, and to seek to gather 
intelligence…Overall, there was a continued high level of covert activity.”107  In their 
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second to last report before ceasing operations, the commission wrote of RIRA’s 
intelligence activities:  
Others targeted were people whom dissidents suspected were involved in 
antisocial behaviour; for example, in April a journalist in Belfast was given a list 
of ten names and addresses, at all of which hoax devices were subsequently 
found. Behind targeting of this kind lies extensive intelligence gathering.108 
While there is little detail on the formal organization of RIRA’s intelligence function and 
the technical sophistication of its collection efforts, it is clear the group is active in 
intelligence activities.  
Al-Qaeda 
 In 1988, Al-Qaeda was formed by Osama Bin Laden and his associates as a multi-
national Salafi jihadist group. Al-Qaeda was based on Bin Laden’s experience fighting 
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.109 Throughout its existence, Al Qaeda has 
received varying levels of support from states and other non-state groups. This includes 
the Sudanese government, and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Generally, Al-Qaeda has been 
able to draw upon these relationships to build its intelligence function. For example, it 
received training and equipment from the Sudanese intelligence services and military.110  
From its early days, Al-Qaeda’s leadership emphasized the importance of intelligence 
and had several high-ranking members well versed in tradecraft.111  Al-Qaeda has 
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demonstrated an impressive aptitude for intelligence activities, even while engaged in a 
decade-long battle with the world’s foremost intelligence agencies. 
From its inception until 1996, when Bin Laden formally declared his fatwah 
against the United States, Al Qaeda utilized several intelligence activities in pursuit of its 
organizational goals.112  In this early period, Al Qaeda’s organizational structure was 
hierarchical and tightly controlled by the top leadership.  The intelligence functions 
included an entire branch of operatives directly under Bin Laden’s command.  Al Qaeda 
operatives were well trained in surveillance and intelligence-gathering techniques, 
scouting potential targets for attacks, taking photographs, and even developing the film 
themselves.113  Dedicated intelligence officers were placed in the group’s terror cells 
abroad.114  Additionally, Abu Omar, a high-ranking al Qaeda member who previously 
served in the Egyptian military, trained many operatives in intelligence gathering. After 
immigrating to the United States, Abu Omar enlisted in the US Army and was stationed 
at Fort Bragg.115  Using training manuals he stole while working at Fort Bragg, Abu 
Omar likely authored numerous terrorist-training manuals used by Al Qaeda members 
throughout the world.116 
Al Qaeda also utilized covert action in its early years, showing a proclivity for 
disseminating propaganda. For example, beginning in 1994, Al Qaeda began sharing its 
message in the Jihad magazine and published a weekly newspaper called Nashrat al 
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Akhbar.  Leadership also developed close contacts with international media, using these 
outlets to disseminate documentaries about Bin Laden and issue public condemnations of 
the Saudi and US governments.117  The group established a propaganda office in London, 
known as the “Advice and Reformation Committee.”118 Al Qaeda was beginning to 
spread its message globally in order to garner popular support, but its ability to do so 
remained modest during this period. 
Al Qaeda also utilized a number of counterintelligence techniques prior to 1996, 
including background-checking recruits, establishing aliases and cover identities, and 
coding communications.  However, their international counterintelligence had a number 
of vulnerabilities, including a lack of vetting for recruits and lax security practices when 
using computers.119 It was not until Osama Bin Laden issued his fatwa against the US in 
1996 that the full force of international intelligence agencies was brought against Al 
Qaeda, forcing the group’s leadership to address these vulnerabilities with more vigor.   
One of the most noticeable developments of Al-Qaeda’s intelligence function was 
the increased sophistication of its counterintelligence practices following Bin Laden’s 
declaration of war against the United States in 1996.  Al Qaeda relocated its core to 
Afghanistan during this time, establishing a safe haven in the country from which to 
operate.  In its training camps, leaders began wearing face covers to protect their 
identities.  Recruits were no longer allowed to bring tape recorders, cameras, radios, 
video equipment, or other potential recording devices into the camps. Recruits were also 
put through more vigorous vetting before acceptance into the group, and were instructed 
in internal security practices.  Al Qaeda also strengthened counterintelligence practices in 
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its interactions with the media.  In at least one instance, Al Qaeda technical experts edited 
the tape recording taken by a foreign reporter to remove the faces of group members 
caught on film.  Al Qaeda leadership also heightened their personal security measures, 
separating themselves from new recruits and outsiders.  Communications methods were 
enhanced as well, including the implementation of a coded communication system and an 
avoidance of unsecure email and phones, sometimes using personal couriers for 
messages.120  It should be noted, however, that Al Qaeda used other means of electronic 
communications, and sometimes used encryption when it did, suggesting they were 
adapting to new means of covert communications.121 
At it began to plan large-scale, global attacks, Al Qaeda significantly increased its 
intelligence activities.  As early as 1997, Al Qaeda operatives conducted reconnaissance 
on potential targets by using video surveillance.122  At roughly the same time, evidence 
suggests Al Qaeda also formalized its intelligence reporting.  Al Qaeda’s leadership 
instructed its operatives to create standardized “casing reports,” which were structured 
with a certain level of uniformity, included maps, drawings, or other relevant materials, 
and were then classified, prioritized, and disseminated back to leadership for analysis.123  
The group established international cells to plan operations against the West. Al Qaeda 
also made extensive use of open source intelligence collection as early as the late 1990s, 
using the Internet, newspapers, magazines and other sources to compile intelligence that 
would be sent to leadership for analysis.124  
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During this period, covert action was still limited to propaganda.  Bin Laden 
engaged with international media in an effort to reach Muslims globally with his message 
of Jihad.  Al Qaeda often signed its name to the propaganda, but some of it was designed 
to be of unknown origins, including anonymous interactions on online chat forums.125  
The group also cultivated networks of sympathetic contacts abroad to help spread their 
message and drive recruits to the terrorist group.126   
Al Qaeda has also demonstrated a unique intelligence activity not seen in other 
VNSAs—concerted intelligence analysis.  Al Qaeda’s leadership received intelligence 
reports from its cells that were conducting surveillance of targets and then used that 
information to inform decision-making on final target selection, methods of execution, 
and the best operatives to carry out specific missions.127 Al Qaeda’s leadership also 
engaged in strategic and political intelligence analysis, assessing various geopolitical 
situations and estimating potential outcomes for their actions.128  For example, in 2003, 
the group assessed that the US would withdraw from Iraq if it became too economically 
costly.  Therefore, Al Qaeda analyzed that it should reduce the number of US allies in 
Iraq, ultimately deciding that was the most vulnerable and faced the most domestic 
opposition to the war in Iraq.  An Al Qaeda document revealed that the group then 
assessed that it should target Spanish forces with attacks in order to influence the 
country’s political sentiment.129    
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Perhaps the most significant development in Al Qaeda’s intelligence function is 
its growing aptitude at conducting intelligence activities on the Internet. Al Qaeda first 
appeared on the Internet in 2000, but did not become a heavy Internet user for 
intelligence purposes until the United States invasion of Afghanistan forced the 
dispersion of the group’s leadership.130  As early as 2006, for example, Al Qaeda used 
satellite reconnaissance imagery available online to aid in planning attacks.131 In what Al 
Qaeda has deemed the “electronic jihad,” the group also utilizes the Internet to spread its 
message globally, recruit new members, and train current members.  Covert action in the 
form of online propaganda takes many forms.  Al Qaeda posts sermons, educational 
materials, internal strategy documents, flashy recruitment videos, and advertisements 
supporting their jihadist mission on many Internet forums.132  This method been assessed 
as highly effective at promoting the jihadist agenda and radicalizing Muslins and non-
Muslims alike.   
Al Qaeda has also been known to use Internet forums to post intelligence training 
courses and other lessons in tradecraft.133 This was likely born out of necessity as training 
camps, once the physical classroom for the group’s intelligence education, were largely 
eradicated during the Global War on Terror.134  The Internet also provided Al Qaeda with 
a critical source for open source intelligence gathering.  While the group was known to 
use the Internet to conduct OSINT in preparing the 9/11 attacks, there is evidence that 
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suggests they became more reliant on this method over time.135  There is even evidence to 
suggest that Al Qaeda may have the technical sophistication to probe US critical 
infrastructure via cyber means.136  However, no evidence was found that Al Qaeda has 
indeed carried out cyber attacks or any cyber espionage (beyond the intelligence activities 
noted above). 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
ISIL is a militant Sunni terrorist group formed as a splinter group of Al Qaeda in 
Iraq (AQI). It was founded in 2006 by the successors of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as “the 
Islamic State in Iraq.” In 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was appointed as leader. This is 
the same time that ISIL became involved in the rebellion against Syrian President Bashar 
al-Assad.  In 2013, ISIL burst onto the international scene after a number of battlefield 
victories, when it formally announced itself as “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant,” and 
claimed its areas of control as its “caliphate,” or a state governed in accordance with 
Islamic Law (Sharia).137 ISIL has a formalized intelligence function known as the 
“Emni,” also referred to as its security group.  
The data on ISIL and its intelligence function is recent and is limited to a small 
sampling of literature based primarily on a cache of documents discovered in 2014.138  
The documents belonged to Haji Bakr, a former colonel in the intelligence service of 
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Saddam Hussein’s Air Defense Force. Bakr was the architect of the Emni and helped 
establish ISIL’s caliphate in the earliest stages of its conquest.139 Haji Bakr modeled the 
Emni similar to a state intelligence agency with rigid structure, reporting lines, and 
delineation of responsibilities. The documents reveal that the establishment of ISIL’s 
caliphate in Iraq and Syria itself was the product of meticulously crafted intelligence 
activities, and could be considered the Emni’s first covert action.   
Bakr set out a plan for the Emni to takeover, village by village, what would 
become ISIL’s caliphate.  Operatives infiltrated towns by opening a Dawah office, or 
Islamic missionary center.  The Dawah offices served as a means to begin subtly 
propagandizing to and spying on the local population.  Emni spies collected intelligence 
about the town’s leaders, the religious and political atmosphere, prominent families, and 
any details regarding armed forces in the village.  The Dawah offices also recruited 
operatives from the local population.  When it was determined the Emni had enough 
support in a village, ISIL forces moved in, seemingly overnight, erecting their flag and 
laying claim to the area. If intelligence collection unearthed potential opponents or 
individuals who would cause trouble, the security forces eliminated them.  In villages 
with a large presence of armed groups, the Emni cut deals with them or pit groups against 
each other to clear the way for ISIL forces.  In other instances, the Emni used 
intimidation tactics such as public executions to deter possible resistors.  It is in these 
ways that ISIL was able to slowly take over significant swaths of land in Iraq and Syria 
before facing their first unified resistance from Syrian rebel groups.140 Such audacious 
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covert action of this scale is evidenced only by ISIL among the VNSAs examined for this 
study.   
Supporting the group’s ability to conduct such operations are advanced 
intelligence and counterintelligence activities.  The Emni trained their operatives in 
routine surveillance and covert communications, and ordered intelligence collection on 
everything from the number of houses in a village and the names and occupations of each 
household member to the political ties of every villager.141  This is also indicative of 
some level of intelligence analysis, although there is no specific evidence of an advanced 
analytical capability or function in the Emni. Counterintelligence methods revealed in the 
testimony of former ISIL members include extensive background checks, dedicated 
counterintelligence operatives, and the recruiting of spies and informants from rival 
groups.142 
Like Al Qaeda, ISIL has shown an aptitude for using the Internet for propaganda 
and recruiting, and well as communications.  ISIL publishes several magazines online to 
spread its messages to its followers, and has been known to use social media to radicalize 
members abroad.143  ISIL members were once encouraged to communicate using freely 
available mobile apps that allowed for encrypted communications.144  The group has 
shown its adaptability, using modern technologies to assist in its collection of 
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intelligence, including ISIL’s use of Google Maps to help in the preparation of attacks.145  
The group has also recently been using commercially available drones to conduct aerial 
reconnaissance.146  Incorporating such advanced means of intelligence collection 
illustrates the group’s propensity for adapting to the times, and mirroring the intelligence 
activities of states’ intelligence functions. 
Discussion 
The hypothesis that VNSAs intelligence functions have developed over the past 
two decades in a similar way to that of states, but delayed, was supported by data in two 
cases.  PIRA, which showed adaptability in its intelligence function but did not see any 
major developments over the period of study, is the only case that provides evidence 
against the hypothesis.  PIRA utilized highly sophisticated collection prior to the period 
of study (e.g. collecting SIGINT on par with the capabilities of its state adversaries), but 
did not significantly develop any of these activities after it agreed to a ceasefire in 1997.  
PIRA consistently utilized proven intelligence activities such as basic 
reconnaissance and HUMINT.  Even the Castlereagh break-in, PIRA’s most significant 
intelligence achievement in decades, was carried out by human agents using forged 
documents.  The group was able to decrypt the disks they stole, but an outside agent 
could have done this for them.  There is simply no evidence to suggest that PIRA 
strongly followed any of the trends seen in states’ intelligence agencies over the same 
decade, namely an increased reliance on technology and open source intelligence.  IRA 
Scholar J. Boyer explained PIRA’s preference for less sophisticated intelligence 
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activities. He said, “If the lights in London were to be turned off, [PIRA] bombed the 
power stations rather than tinkered with the computers.”147  
The lack of developments in PIRAs intelligence function may also be explained 
by their 1997 agreement to cease hostilities.  However, it does appear that their 
intelligence functions were still operating as late as 2002. Further, RIRA, the most 
current iteration of Irish Republican terrorists, is still conducting intelligence activities.  It 
has also been proposed that these groups are active in online forums, perhaps indicating 
intent to propagandize and recruit new members through the Internet.148  This would 
represent a significant development in the intelligence function of this VNSA, but the 
lack of supporting evidence available casts doubt on the legitimacy of this claim. It 
should be noted that PIRA and RIRA’s theater of operation is limited, which may also 
explain why its intelligence function did not develop as significantly as groups who are 
engaged globally (such as Al Qaeda and ISIL).  PIRA and RIRA have been familiar with 
their adversary (UK law enforcement and intelligence), for decades and may have been 
more likely to trust the activities they knew worked for them previously.  
Al Qaeda’s intelligence functions made a number of significant developments 
from 1997 until 2000, and again after around 2003.  To summarize, the development of 
Al Qaeda’s intelligence functions are shown in Table 1: 
Table 1, Developments in Al Qaeda’s intelligence function 
Intelligence Activity Significant Developments Year 
Collection Video; commercial imagery 1997; 2006 
Open Source 
Collection 
Standard; Internet Increased use over period of study; 
2003 (aapx) 
Covert Action Print and mainstream media; 1997-present; 2003 (appx) 
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Counterintelligence Improved background 
checks; coded 
communications; encryption 





Tradecraft training Detailed and formalized; 
internet based 
1997; 2002 (appx) 
Intelligence Analysis Standard; political 1997-present; 2003-present 
Source: Gaetano Joe Ilardi, “Al-Qaeda's Counterintelligence Doctrine: The Pursuit of Operational 
Certainty and Control;” Gaetano Joe Ilardi, "Al Qaeda's Operational Intelligence—A Key 
Prerequisite to Action;" and Mobley, Terrorism and Counter-Intelligence: How Terrorist Groups 
Elude Detection.    
 
As seen in Table 1, Al Qaeda evidenced a number of noteworthy developments in 
its intelligence function.  Many of these developments, such as the incorporation of video 
into their surveillance methods in 1997, or their adoption of encryption technology in 
approximately 2000, illustrate that Al Qaeda, much like states’ intelligence agencies, 
grew increasingly reliant on technology over time. Al Qaeda’s use of commercial 
imagery in 2006 supports the hypothesis that VNSAs’ intelligence functions develop in 
similar ways to those of states’ intelligence agencies, but delayed.149 Al Qaeda’s 
intelligence function also mirrored another trend seen in the development of states’ 
intelligence agencies—the increased use of open source intelligence.  The group was 
known to collect OSINT prior to the 9/11 attacks, but their use of it became more 
prominent as they began using the Internet for many of their intelligence activities.  Al 
Qaeda has even published instructions online for its followers to learn how to carry out 
“Open Source Jihad.”150 
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 The data on ISIL also supports the hypothesis as the group emulates at least one 
trend exhibited by states’ intelligence agencies—an increased reliance on technology.  
ISIL makes heavy use of the Internet for propaganda purposes and recruitment.  The 
group has also evidenced the use of commercial imagery for planning attacks, and has 
utilized commercially available drones for conducting reconnaissance.  It is also worth 
reiterating that ISIL has demonstrated a unique ability for carrying out sophisticated 
covert actions.  This is a significant development, but is difficult to compare to trends in 
states’ intelligence agencies, as data on covert action is naturally limited due to its 
secrecy.   
 After examining the data on the intelligence functions of three VNSAs, it is clear 
that two groups have made significant developments over the study period, and that these 
developments largely mirror trends seen in states’ intelligence agencies.  Both Al Qaeda 
and ISIL developed their intelligence functions in highly organized manners with 
operatives who had advanced training in tradecraft such as Abu Omar (Al Qaeda) and 
Haji Bakr (ISIL).  Inherent to this reality is the fact that these organizations learned from 
states’ intelligence agencies and likely emulated their methods, at least to some degree.  
However, the intelligence functions of VNSAs lacked the same resources, both 
technological and financial, as states.  As such, operatives such as Abu Omar and Haji 
Bakr were likely fully aware of the utility of highly encrypted communications or UAV 
reconnaissance, but had to wait for the technologies to become more easily available 
before incorporating them into their own methods.  
The research also yielded unexpected results.  Perhaps the most surprising 
development in any single VNSA’s intelligence function is the increased use of OSINT 
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by Al Qaeda.  On the surface, this seems logical.  Global access to the Internet has made 
a wealth of information available to anyone who seeks it.  However, understanding the 
utility of this information and incorporating it into the intelligence function in the same 
way states’ intelligence agencies have further demonstrates a thorough understanding of 
how their adversaries operate. Al Qaeda also was the only VNSA that exhibited 
concerted intelligence analysis in a somewhat structured form. The fact that leadership 
undertook advanced political analysis on its adversaries shows a high level of 
sophistication in its intelligence function, unmatched by any of the other VNSAs studied.  
ISIL also exhibited a unique penchant for large-scale covert action.  While other groups 
showed the ability to conduct the same intelligence activities as ISIL, they did not in turn 
use these activities to take over large swaths of land in such a meticulously planned 
fashion.   
Conclusion 
 This paper set out to determine how the intelligence functions of violent non-state 
actors have developed over the past two decades.  By establishing how VNSAs’ 
intelligence functions operated prior to the period of study, it was determined that these 
groups typically conduct significant HUMINT collection, frequently utilize covert action 
in the form of propaganda, and traditionally enforce strong counterintelligence measures. 
It was also determined that states’ intelligence agencies have demonstrated recent trends 
including an increased reliance on technology for intelligence collection and an increased 
use of OSINT.  A hypothesis was formed that the intelligence functions of VNSAs have 
developed similarly to those of states’ intelligence agencies, but delayed. A series of case 
studies was undertaken, examining the intelligence functions of three VNSAs prior to the 
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period of study, and during. After examining the case studies, this hypothesis was proven 
correct, though there was opposing evidence in one case. 
 This study has demonstrated that the intelligence functions of VNSAs generally 
have shown significant developments over the past two decades.  Moreover, these 
developments appear to support the hypothesis that developments in VNSAs intelligence 
functions are similar to the developments seen in in states’ intelligence agencies, 
although delayed.  This conclusion is limited only to the cases studied.  More research 
should be done on the intelligence functions of other VNSAs, but the existing data is 
limited in sample size and by the classified nature of much of the information.  Similar 
research of a more quantitative nature would also serve the field of intelligence studies 
greatly.  The implications of the supported hypothesis of this study point to the utility of a 
future trend analysis of developments in both states’ and VNSAs’ intelligence functions.  
Such an analysis may provide indicators as to how VNSAs will develop in the future.  By 
demonstrating that VNSAs have not only sophisticated intelligence functions, but also the 
ability to significantly enhance their activities over time, it can now be seen how vital 
these functions are to the continued existence of VNSAs and how states may adjust their 




Chapter 3: The Impact of New Space Based Military and 
Intelligence Programs on Space Relations 
Introduction 
The practice of intelligence collection dates back thousands of years, when human 
agents collected information, mapped battlefields, and clandestinely shared information.  
As technology has progressed over time, so have the means for intelligence collection.  
For example, when aerial balloons were first used for manned-flight, they were quickly 
implemented for use in battle.  The same was done with airplanes in World War I and II. 
In World War I, the advent of communication over radio and telegram led to a source for 
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collection, allowing for interceptions of direct 
communications from the enemy.  SIGINT provided a new source of actionable, real time 
intelligence and quickly became crucial to intelligence operations. When the USSR and 
US entered into the Cold War after WWII, an increased sense of urgency was placed on 
intelligence collection due to the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons.  Because 
collecting intelligence via HUMINT was increasingly difficult and dangerous 
(particularly for the US), these countries used technological innovation to develop 
alternative means for intelligence collection.  Looking at a new frontier in space, satellite 
systems were developed to collect intelligence on adversaries from above with almost 
complete impunity. Satellites provide collection of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) and 
SIGINT, while also enabling global navigation capabilities and other communications.  
These systems became so crucial to intelligence operations immediately after they were 
first fielded that the USSR and US tacitly agreed to allow free use of satellites for 
intelligence collection so as to not have to surrender their own vitally intelligence 
collection platforms. The reliance on these systems has only increased over time. 
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For two decades, only the USSR and US enjoyed the benefit of military and 
intelligence assets in space. In contrast, today any nation with enough funding can 
purchase these systems and the launch services to put them in orbit. While many nations 
were undoubtedly aware of the advantages military and intelligence satellites provided 
prior to the First Gulf War, the conflict demonstrated to the international community the 
central role space assets could command in warfare. Since then, there has been an 
increase in the number of military and intelligence satellites inserted into space by lesser, 
or entirely new, space faring nations, particularly in the last twenty years.151  The 
geopolitics of this arena are further complicated as more nations enter space for national 
security, civil, and commercial purposes. 
There is no single, widely accepted model for how nations will interact in space 
as the domain becomes more populated.152  There has been a robust discussion on how 
nations have interacted in space during the fifty years since the domain first opened, and 
the unprecedented level of space activity in the past two decades warrants similar 
consideration.  Moreover, while in the past many nations entered space for only civil and 
commercial purposes, more nations are now entering space specifically with military and 
intelligence programs.  This chapter adds to the literature on the space domain by 
examining how the recent insertion of military and intelligence assets into space by lesser 
and new space faring nations has impacted the way nations interact in space.153 The 
period of study for this paper is from 2000 to the present day, during which several 
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nations have introduced dedicated military space programs, and numerous others have 
developed or acquired military and intelligence space assets.154  
The first section of this paper provides an overview of the various uses of space, 
surveys the literature on other newly realized domains and how they parallel the space 
domain, and summarizes the relevant theories on how nations interacted in space during 
the first fifty years that the domain was opened. A survey of interactions between space 
faring nations both before, and since, the turn of the century follows in the data section, 
followed by an analysis of these interactions. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the key 
findings about how the insertion of military and intelligence assets by new space faring 
nations has impacted how nations interact in space. 
Literature Review 
To better understand how the recent insertion of space based military and 
intelligence satellites by lesser and new space faring nations has impacted the way 
nations interact in space, key concepts need to be addressed.  First, what are the activities 
in space other than those for national security purposes, and why do nations want military 
and intelligence assets in space?  Additionally, what lessons can be learned about 
interactions between nations in space from their historical interactions in newly realized 
domains, and how did the insertion of new entrants to these domains impact the way in 
which nations interacted?  Lastly, what theories have been applied to understand the 
interactions between nations during the first fifty years that the domain was open? 
Understanding these concepts will help assess how the recent insertion of military and 
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intelligence systems by lesser and new space faring nations has impacted the way nations 
interact in space.  
Space activities generally fit into three divisions: National security, civil, and 
commercial. National security space activities are those that support a nation’s military 
and intelligence functions.  Military and intelligence systems represent a significant 
portion of the number of satellites in orbit, and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) satellites alone are projected to represent 36% of the global space 
market by 2025.155  These include precision navigation and timing satellites (such as the 
US Global Positioning System, or, GPS), protected military communications satellites, 
missile warning and indications satellites, and ISR satellites.  Space based ISR assets can 
serve several functions, including geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), measurement and 
signature intelligence (MASINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection. The 
USSR and US first introduced these systems in the early years of the Cold War with the 
purpose of spying on each other from above to augment terrestrial-based intelligence 
collection.  Because of the increased reliance on these systems from intelligence 
agencies, the sophistication of space based ISR systems has increased significantly since 
their introduction.156  Satellite technologies have also proliferated over time, including to 
commercial actors, allowing more countries to feasibly gain the access to space that was 
once cost-prohibitive for all but the richest nations.  While many nations are motivated to 
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place national security assets in space to enhance security, there are other activities in 
space that are important for political, economic, and humanitarian reasons. 
Civil space activities include scientific missions such as space based weather 
observation or climate change monitoring, and even using satellites to manage 
commercial airline traffic.  Commercial space activities are those conducted by non-
governmental entities, such as satellite television or broadband Internet companies. In 
civil and commercial space activities, there has historically been – and continues to be – a 
certain level of international cooperation.  For example, the USSR and US pursued 
collaborative efforts on scientific missions in the early days of the space race.157  In later 
years, the two nations collaborated on the International Space Station with over a dozen 
other nations.158  In the commercial sector, international cooperation is the norm.  
Companies from different countries can be responsible for each component of getting a 
satellite into space – building the satellite, manufacturing the technology, and providing 
the launch capability to put it in orbit. This cooperation should not necessarily be 
expected, however, in national security space activities, where nations are far more 
secretive about their activities. 
Space is an entirely unique domain with physical characteristics that differentiate 
it from others such as land and sea.  Nonetheless, scholars have drawn parallels to other 
newly realized domains and formulated theories to explain how nations may be expected 
to interact space. The most common comparisons are with the discovery of the New 
World in the 15th century, the opening of the air domain, and the competition over 
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Antarctica. In the examination of the literature on these comparisons below, an attempt is 
made to highlight instances where first occupiers of the domain reacted to the second (or 
later) waves of entrants. Many of these analogies reveal strong similarities between space 
and other domains. However, there are still more questions than answers about how 
nations may be expected to interact in the space domain because of its unique 
characteristics. 
The discovery of the New World, much like the opening of the space domain, saw 
two nations enter first, followed shortly after by many others. The intense competition to 
reach the New World was driven by national pride and technological innovation, and was 
filled with secrecy. Spain and Portugal competed to stake the first claims to land in the 
Americas, and managed to reach an agreement to settle separate areas with the Treaty of 
Tordesillas in 1494.159 The two nations attempted to exclude other nations from the new 
territories by withholding their maps and routes of travel.160 However, the discovery of 
new territory could not be kept secret forever, and soon more nations, including England 
and France, reached the New World, resulting in diplomatic and armed conflict for many 
years.  
While certain parallels have been noted between the discovery of the New World 
and space, differences abound.161  The first fault with this analogy is that no war has been 
fought in space.  Another stark difference is that the opening of the space frontier was 
held in public view as a demonstration of national prowess for the two superpowers, 
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though the technical means were of course closely guarded secrets. Because of this 
imperfect analogy, we are left to look to other models to add to our understanding of how 
nations interact in new domains. 
Security focused analysts have cited an analogy between the opening of the space 
domain and the inception of the air domain. The air domain, first occupied with balloons 
and later with airplanes, was militarized almost immediately – first for reconnaissance in 
war, and then for combat.162 While there were alliances between nations, there was also 
conflict.163  Airplanes were equipped with bombs and guns and quickly became a central 
component of military strategy for air faring nations.  However, international cooperation 
in the air domain was demonstrated as civil aviation grew in sophistication and 
commercial transoceanic flights began. Nations had to cooperate to establish safety 
measures to avoid disaster.164 In this instance, it is seen that some level of international 
cooperation may be expected when the activities in a new domain are of a civil nature.  
Theories on airpower first developed after World War I. Some airpower theorists 
contended that control of the skies meant control over land and sea as well, and espoused 
airpower as the end-all be-all of national power.165 Others believed this was a grave error, 
and noted that airpower must be considered with other forms of military power.166 
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Additionally, some recognized that true airpower included the civilian and commercial 
potential, and not only military strength.167 Though some have drawn similarities 
between the space and air domains, these similarities rest upon the idea that space is the 
dominant military domain for asserting national power.168  While it is true that the space 
domain has become (like the air domain) essential for military, economic, and 
commercial purposes, a nation cannot assert territorial claims in, or from, space.  The 
concept of controlling space remains problematic, and some contend that for this reason 
the application of airpower theory to the space domain is simply not realistic.169 
Some scholars also refer to the case of Antarctica to inform studies of 
international interaction in the space domain.170  Seven nations staked claims to the arctic 
by the 1940s, and disputes over the territory threatened to boil over into open conflict. 
The USSR and US also desired access to Antarctica after WWII. International 
cooperation in this domain manifested in the International Geophysical Year in 1957, an 
agreement that opened the territory to scientific research by twelve countries.  This 
scientific cooperation resulted in further negotiations, led by the US, to establish 
governing principles for international activities in Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty was 
agreed to in 1959, settling disputes over contested claims and allowing the new 
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superpowers the right to stake claims as well.171  However, third world nations opposed 
the limited membership of the Antarctic Treaty and argued for their right to the territory.  
After being allowed to visit the region, experiencing the harsh climate, and seeing the 
difficulty of resource extraction, many backed off their protests. Later protests by dozens 
of nations for the right to drill for oil in Antarctica were also ultimately denied, and in 
1991, Antarctic Treaty members agreed to prohibit mining in the territory for fifty 
years.172 
The similarities between the space domain and the Antarctic are numerous: an 
extremely harsh environment, an unknown extent of valuable resources, and a vast, 
unexplored amount of territory. The Antarctic analogy is also apt in that nations 
ultimately decided to not extend territorial claims into the domain and promoted its 
peaceful use.  This came after the initial impulse to militarize the domain. There is also a 
similarity in these domains in that both have a financial barrier to entry. Nations who felt 
cheated by the Antarctic Treaty were nonetheless hesitant to stake claims after realizing 
the costs associated with resource extraction. Lastly, the Antarctic, like space, has never 
seen direct international conflict.173  Despite these similarities, the differences between 
Antarctica and space are significant.  Namely, the advantages seen in occupying 
Antarctica are primarily scientific research and resource extraction, whereas space offers 
immense advantages for military and intelligence purposes in addition to these other 
missions. As such, the space domain has seen the ongoing insertion of military and 
intelligence assets, notably absent from the Antarctic, since it was first opened.  
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These analogies establish similarities between other newly realized domains and 
space, but none are a perfect match.  They do, however, provide the history of 
international interactions in new domains, and demonstrate that new frontiers are ripe for 
international competition, and have often seen outright conflict.  Yet, there are 
opportunities for cooperation as well.  This makes the question of interactions between 
nations in space particularly complicated, and accordingly there has been both 
competition and cooperation in space when it was occupied by only a few nations. While 
they were the only nations in space, the US and USSR were mostly competitive, and 
periodically came close to open hostility.  However, there were also moments of 
cooperation and détente. As other nations slowly began to enter space, the two 
superpowers demonstrated a willingness to share technology and collaborate on missions 
with these new nations, but did so only selectively. These trends in the first fifty years of 
space history gave rise to several schools of thought on international interactions in 
space.  These include: space nationalism, global institutionalism, technological 
determinism, and social interactionism.174   
Space nationalism, informed by the political theory of realism, argues mainly that 
nations are driven to secure dominance in space over their rivals and that activities in the 
domain are motivated by competition.  Proponents of space nationalism doubt the 
effectiveness of international agreements to limit competition or war in space.175  This 
theory worked well during the first two decades of space exploration, but was 
undermined by the development of international legal frameworks for space collaboration 
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in the late 1960’s and 1970’s.  However, space nationalists continue to cite the ongoing 
militarization of space as evidence for their theories.176  Global institutionalism is defined 
by the belief that international cooperation, treaties, and organizations will most likely 
guide interactions in space in a peaceful manner.177  This school of thought gained 
momentum with the signing of the United Nations Outer Space Treaty in 1967 and 
peaked during the 1970’s, which saw a period of détente between the US and USSR in 
space.178   
Technological determinism includes both an optimistic theory – where 
technological determinists saw advanced scientific research and development as a driver 
of international cooperation in space – and the opposing viewpoint that military space 
technologies drove, and would continue to drive, the development of the space domain.179 
The optimistic school of thought was introduced in the early years of the space race and 
resurfaced when more nations began contributing to the International Space Station in 
later years.  The more pessimistic views were prevalent throughout the Cold War and 
were reinvigorated towards the late 1990’s when the US government began considering 
defensive space capabilities.180  Social interactionism scholars argue that there are enough 
policy tools in place for space-faring nations to avoid all out conflict in space.  Moreover, 
they argue that the US – as a leader in space – can influence trends in the domain.181 
                                                 
176 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 23-40. 
177 See: Arthur C. Clarke, The Exploration of Space (New York: Harper, 1959); Willey Ley, Harnessing 
Space (New York: Macmillan, 1963); Lt. Col. (USAF) Bruce DeBlois, “Space Sanctuary: A Viable 
National Strategy,” Aerospace Power Journal, vol. 12, No. 4 (Winter 1998);  
178 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 29-31. 
179 For a more detailed discussion of technological determinism and its scholars, see: Moltz, The Politics of 
Space Security, 34-37. 
180 Ibid. 
181 For social interactionism, see: Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1987); John Lewis Gaddis, “The Evolution of a Reconnaissance Satellite Regime,” 
in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds. U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: 
 
 76 
These schools of thought provide useful lenses through which to view international 
interactions in space, and each has been applicable at different moments in history.  It 
will prove useful to see if current interactions between nations in space fit any of these 
models that were mostly developed during the Cold War years. 
In examining these underlying concepts of the space domain, there are several key 
takeaways.  Space activities can take many forms, including national security, civil, and 
commercial activities.  It is also understood that in some ways, interactions between 
nations in the space domain parallel interactions in previous new frontiers, but space is 
too unique an environment for any analogy to be perfect.  As such, several schools of 
thought about how nations have and will continue to interact in space have emerged, 
though each school has waxed and waned in its applicability. These understandings 
inform the hypothesis of this paper, that the insertion of military and intelligence assets 
by lesser and new space faring nations has led to a decrease in cooperative space activity.   
Theory and Hypothesis 
Drawing on theories from the space nationalism school of thought, the hypothesis 
of this paper is that the recent insertion of military and intelligence assets by lesser and 
new space faring nations has led to a decrease in cooperative space activity. This 
hypothesis is also informed by several theories.  First, historical lessons from other new 
domains reveal that nations often compete in these frontiers, and that competition can 
increase when more nations enter the domain. Second, the history of the space domain 
shows that nations compete for superiority in national security space capabilities.  This 
was the case for the USSR, US, and shortly after, China.  Now, as space technology 
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continues to proliferate, we may expect to see more nations entering this competition.  
Third, because military and intelligence space technologies are available commercially, 
the need for nascent space faring or non-space faring nations to rely on a partner for 
technology transfers is removed.  Lastly, space has become an essential domain even for 
nations that do not have their own space assets.  Because nations rely on space for key 
infrastructure, commerce, and environmental monitoring, more nations may feel the need 
to protect these assets in the event of a war in space.  As such, nations that were once 
content to have only civil and commercial assets in space may now seek to place their 
own military and intelligence assets there as well. By examining how nations have 
interacted in space in more recent years, this paper tests the hypothesis and determines if 
the supporting theories are supported.    
Methods 
To answer the research question, a series of case studies were examined.  The 
case studies are grouped around nations that entered space during the period of 2000 until 
the first half of 2017, either for the first time or for the first time with dedicated military 
and intelligence assets.  The data presented demonstrate subsequent interactions between 
nations in space.  The data used in this research design are from a wide variety of sources 
including: news reports, national policy documents, e.g. US Congressional or Department 
of Defense (DOD) documents or Japanese national space policy, testimony from nations’ 
space leaders, and United Nations (UN) discussions and policies.  The dependent variable 
is the behavior of nations in space, and the independent variable is the insertion of space 
based military and intelligence assets by nations who previously did not possess them.  
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The data is first presented in the case studies, and then measured against the 
behaviors seen in the first fifty years of space exploration, characterized by the limited 
number of countries in space, to determine if any major changes in nations’ behavior are 
discernable.  Evidence for the hypothesis includes changes in a nation’s space policy to 
increase its own military and intelligence systems or presence in direct response to a new 
nation’s entry to space. Evidence for the hypothesis also includes outright condemnations 
of a new nation’s entry to space, or a withdrawal from cooperative agreements or 
international treaties that include space activities.  Evidence against the hypothesis 
includes new cooperative agreements, technology sharing (though there is a caveat that 
two nations may do so explicitly to balance against another), or one nation championing 
another’s insertion of military and intelligence assets into space.   
The case studies were chosen because they are notable new entrants into space 
with military and intelligence systems.  Moreover, these cases cover a set of nations with 
varying alliances internationally, and therefore would logically draw a wide range of 
international response. Additionally, some of these nation’s insertions of military and 
intelligence assets came as a surprise to many countries, making the reactions from other 
space faring nations very valuable to observe.  The examination of these cases will 
determine how the recent insertion of space-based military and intelligence assets by 
lesser and new space faring nations has changed interactions between nations in the space 
domain. 
Data 
Many works have been written on the relationships between the premier space 
faring nations – Russia, the US, and China.  To establish a point of comparison for 
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current interactions in space between nations, a summary of the interactions over the first 
fifty years of the space domain is necessary.  
After the USSR launched the first satellite, Sputnik-1, into orbit, the space-race 
began. Instead of providing a way to cooperate in space, the civil space mission of 
landing a man on the Moon became a reason for competition. The US and Russia also 
tested nuclear weapons in orbit, sparking not only concerns about the nuclear threat, but 
also the threats these tests posed to satellites.182 To place some regulations on military 
space activities, the two superpowers agreed to stop testing nuclear weapons in space in 
1963 with the Limited Test Ban Treaty. However, they still retained the right to develop 
other military and intelligence assets in space.183  These first years of the space race are 
best characterized by space nationalism. 
An international effort was made at the United Nations to govern the use of space, 
and The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 was established as the true foundation of 
international space law.  It was also around this time that France and Japan became the 
third and fourth nations (respectively) to develop their own launch capabilities and 
successfully place satellites into orbit.184 The United States cooperated with and assisted 
Japan in developing its civil space capabilities.  Russia, on the other hand, had recently 
cut ties with China, which it had previously provided with scientific assistance for the 
Chinese military space program.185  China entered space independently in 1970, making 
it the fifth country to launch a satellite into orbit.  Through the 1960s, the premier space 
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faring nations did indeed cooperate with other nations in space, but mainly competed 
with each other.   
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (OST), which was ratified by the first three space 
faring nations (USSR, US, and China) and over one-hundred others, established key 
principles for international space law and emphasizes that activities in space should be 
peaceful and cooperative.  This is a key piece of evidence for the proponents of global 
institutionalism, who contend that agreements such as the OST will lead to the peaceful 
use of space.  The OST was written specifically so the USSR and US would retain the 
right to keep their military and intelligence assets in space. The treaty only explicitly bans 
placing nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in space, and prevents military 
activities on the moon.186 Because of the treaty’s bans on extension of territorial claims 
into space, the treaty established the right of over flight, or, the right to fly satellites over 
other sovereign nations.  Other key provisions of the treaty include: establishing all 
nations’ rights to explore and use outer space; limiting the use of the Moon and other 
celestial bodies to peaceful purposes; and affirming states’ responsibility for national 
activities in outer space whether by governmental agencies or non-governmental 
agencies.187  
The next decades saw a period of détente and an unprecedented level of 
cooperation between the two superpowers, the USSR and US, followed by heightened 
tensions as the Cold War heated up in the 1980s. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
(ABM) of 1972 limited the ability of the two superpowers to deploy both land and space-
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based missile defense systems.188  The signing of this treaty by both nations was seen as a 
step forward for cooperation in space. In addition to the ABM treaty, both nations made 
overtures about possible treaties against anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, though none 
were signed. Interestingly, during this two-decade span both nations assisted India in 
developing its own space capabilities, lending some credit to the theories of technological 
determinism. Eventually, the US and USSR agreed to begin cooperating on civil space 
missions in 1987, and this has continued in some form to present day – though there are 
still significant tensions between the two nations in their space relations.   
There are also international legal frameworks in place that suggest cooperation in 
space can be expected to a limited degree. The OST contains some provisions that 
address the issue of managing orbital debris, but as more collisions between satellites 
occurred over time, the UN worked to create more regulation to prevent crises.  
Eventually, in 2007, the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) 
endorsed the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines aimed at increasing “mutual 
understanding on acceptable activities in space,” thus enhancing “stability in space-
related matters,” and decreasing “the likelihood of friction and conflict.”189 Space traffic 
management is an ongoing issue, and many calls have been made for more international 
cooperation in this arena.190 Another area in which there are international regulations on 
space activities is in the telecommunications sector.  The International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) has distributed rights to the radio frequency spectrum 
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since the 1960s.  Communications satellites need to use the radio frequency spectrum to 
transmit their data, and spectrum is a finite resource.  This includes spectrum allocations 
for secured satellite communications, e.g. for military purposes.  Nations meet at the ITU 
to discuss matters of international spectrum allocation on a regular basis.191   
The space race between the USSR and US was motivated by national pride, 
competitive spirit, and the desire to spy on one another from above. While they were the 
only actors in space, the two nations were mostly competitive, and periodically came 
close to open hostility.  However, there were also moments of cooperation and détente. 
As other nations began to enter space, the two superpowers demonstrated a willingness to 
selectively share technology and collaborate on missions with these new nations.  At the 
end of the 1990s, the space domain could be characterized as cooperative, albeit 
militarized.   
Yet the number of actors in space then was nowhere near the level it is today.  
And even prior to the increased entry of new nations into space, international concerns 
about conflict in the domain abounded. The question remains: how has the dramatically 
higher number of nations inserting not only civil and commercial, but also military and 
intelligence capabilities into space, changed how nations interact in space? The data will 
demonstrate whether space faring nations are now more willing to work cooperatively or 
tend more toward competition and even hostility. 
Japan192 
Japan began developing its own space capabilities during the Cold War for 
scientific and economic purposes. Japan’s early space activities were strictly non-military 
                                                 
191 International Telecommunication Union, “About ITU,” ITU Website, 
http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/default.aspx.  
192 A brief timeline of the events in the data section can be found in the appendices. 
 
 83 
and based on the principles of “international cooperation, “peaceful purposes,” and 
“openness to the public” from the earliest stages.193 This changed in 1998 when North 
Korea launched a missile that flew over Japanese territory, catching the Japanese 
government by surprise and spurring them to commence a reconnaissance satellite 
program for national security purposes.194  The inauguration of this program was also 
prompted as a means to develop an independent set of space intelligence assets.  The 
president of Japan’s National Space Development Agency noted that “technological 
independence” and “information independence” were central for Japan at that time.195  
Japan launched its Information Gathering Satellites (IGS) in March 2003, prompting a 
sharp response from North Korea.196 Elsewhere, the response to Japan’s new space based 
intelligence assets was quiet. The launch of these satellites marked a sea change in 
Japan’s space policy, which was soon updated to reflect their desire to further utilize 
space for military and intelligence purposes.  
In 2008 and 2009, Japan updated its space policy to allow for the development 
and use of space for military purposes, so long as any space systems were defensive in 
nature.197  These changes to Japanese space policy came shortly after China’s test of an 
anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in 2007, and were made with the specific aim to “enforce 
the national security for the purpose of improving and reinforcing information gathering 
functions and enhancement of warning and surveillance activities in the light of the 
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international situation, especially the circumstances in North East Asia.”198  While this 
introduction of military and intelligence space assets was a major change for Japan, the 
country still aimed to promote diplomacy in space.   
The same policy that established a military space program also affirmed Japanese 
commitment to seek further collaboration with the premier space faring nations, including 
China.199 Japanese cooperation with other nations in space continued – and even 
expanded – after the institution of its national security space program. A major step in its 
updated space policy set in motion Japanese efforts to help Vietnam develop its own 
space based earth observation capabilities. Japan also began projects with India, the 
European Space Agency (ESA), and other nations, while continuing its efforts on the 
International Space Station (ISS).  Japan also initiated several regional cooperative 
programs, including a joint Earth-observation project with India, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam.200  
As Japan continued to place more military and intelligence systems into space 
since 2003, it also increased cooperation in space with the US, notably on military 
missions.  In 2013, Japan updated its National Security Policy to integrate Japan’s space 
policy with its military strategy and to call for closer coordination with the US in military 
space.201  Welcoming this increased cooperation, in 2015 the US updated its joint defense 
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guidelines with Japan, ensuring increased cooperation in military space.202  It should be 
noted that Japan still wants to achieve a higher level of independence in this relationship 
to “move from dependency to coexistence with the U.S.”203 Japan also established 
trilateral relations for intelligence sharing with South Korea through the US in 2014.204 
As a regional rival to Japan in space capabilities, China has been taciturn about its 
thoughts on Japan’s increased military space activity, though Chinese state-media 
reported Japan’s 2008 space policy revisions as having hostile intent.205  The two nations 
have cooperated in a limited capacity on certain civil space missions and issues since 
2000, but many perceive the relationship as adversarial; proposing that the two nations 
are vying for regional dominance in space through demonstrations of their advanced 
space capabilities.206  
Turkey 
Turkey initiated plans to acquire its own spy satellites in 2000.207 After deals fell 
through to purchase satellites from Israel and France, Anakara took a different approach – 
establishing collaborative efforts to develop satellites indigenously.  This resulted in the 
BILSAT reconnaissance satellite (2003) and the RASAT reconnaissance program 
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(2004).208 These efforts made use of foreign satellite technologies, but the systems were 
developed in Turkey.  With the intent to further limit reliance on foreign military 
technology, Turkey began the development of the Göktürk satellite program in 2007.209  
Beyond the issue of reliance on other countries for space technology, Turkish military 
officials emphasized the importance of space for autonomous intelligence gathering and 
maintaining effective military operations on the ground.210  Speaking at a ceremony for 
the launch of the second Göktürk satellite in 2016, Turkish President Recep Erdoğan 
stated that it was the country’s goal “to design, produce and send to space satellites more 
advanced than Göktürk-1,” and continued “it is a must for us to develop our satellites by 
ourselves.”  Erdoğan cited military embargoes from western countries as a reason why 
Turkey must develop indigenous space production.211  Though the program involves 
technological cooperation between several foreign companies and Turkish defense 
industry companies, Turkish officials laud the Göktürk program as a major step forward 
for independence in their military space activities. 
International responses to Turkey’s launch of spy satellites were mixed.  The 
BILSAT and RASAT programs were considered civil space efforts and involved 
international cooperation.212  The Göktürk program, however, was clearly military in 
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nature, and caused some concern with other space faring nations.  Defense industry 
companies from Russia, the US, France and South Korea declined to bid on the Göktürk 
proposal, despite ongoing relationships in military sales.213 China, on the other hand, 
provided the launch services for Göktürk-2.  Israel raised significant objections to the 
Göktürk program, citing concerns that Turkey would now be able to produce high-
resolution imagery of Israeli territory.  Israel went so far as to lobby France and the US 
on the matter, albeit to no avail.  Turkish President Recep Erdoğan dismissed these 
concerns and emphasized the importance of the Göktürk program for Turkey’s national 
security.214  
While promoting its own independence in space, Turkey has also been a party to 
several cooperative space agreements.  Outside of its UN Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOUS) membership, Turkey signed on to the Chinese led 
Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) in 2006. APSCO is intended to 
promote the peaceful use of space technology in the Asia-Pacific region; its membership 
consists of China, Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey.215  
Though Japan is not a part of APSCO, Turkey and Japan established their own 
cooperative bilateral relationship in space in 2016.216  Turkey also maintains a 
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cooperative agreement with the European Space Agency (ESA), signed in 2004.217  
Turkey has recently ramped up its plans for national security space and hopes to have 16 
satellites launched by 2023.218  In early 2017, the Turkish parliament took a major step to 
formally establish itself as a regional space power by introducing a draft bill to create a 
Turkish space agency.219 Should Turkey continue on its path to fully indigenous space 
systems and a well-organized space apparatus, it will likely emerge as a formidable space 
power in the region. 
South America 
 Several South American nations have recently developed or acquired military and 
intelligence satellites.  The proliferation of space technologies to South America began 
during the Cold War, but Brazil, Venezuela, Chile, and Peru, have recently launched their 
first satellites for national security purposes. Brazil signaled its intent to use space for its 
military and intelligence needs in its 2008 National Defense Strategy report.220  Brazil has 
sustained a program for dual-use earth observation satellites, named CBERS, with China 
since 2000.221  In 2017, Brazil launched its own military communications satellite 
(SGDC), manufactured by a French-Italian aerospace company – Thales Alenia Space. 
Brazilian space operators also received substantial technical training from Thales Alenia 
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Space.222 The SGDC program was initiated in 2011 to provide secure communications 
for Brazil’s government and military and to achieve a greater level of autonomy in its 
space activities.  This was at least in part prompted by allegations that the US had spied 
on Brazil’s government.223 While establishing its military and intelligence space 
programs, Brazil also established bilateral cooperative agreements with several other 
nations including Argentina, Japan, Germany, Ukraine, Russia, and Canada, and several 
multi-lateral cooperative arrangements.  Despite attempts to re-engage in collaborative 
missions, the US and Brazil have very limited cooperation in space activities, and Brazil 
cites US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) that control the import and 
export of defense materiel and expertise (including space technology), as the primary 
reason.224    
Venezuela also received support from China in acquiring national security space 
assets.  In 2008 and 2012, Venezuela received Chinese assistance in manufacturing and 
launching a communications and earth observation satellite, respectively.225  Then 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez signaled that the development of these satellites was 
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a nod to waning US hegemony in the region.226 Venezuela also stated its intent to 
collaborate with other nations in space activities while still trying to establish itself as a 
regional power.  In 2013, the president of Venezuela’s space agency noted that the 
country would seek collaboration with other South American countries including Brazil 
and Bolivia, and was open to regional cooperative programs such as a launch center that 
would be managed as a bloc.227   
Chile and Peru also recently acquired and launched their first military 
reconnaissance satellites from France’s Airbus Defence and Space company in 2011 and 
2016, respectively.228 Simultaneous with the initiation of these numerous South American 
nations’ national security space programs, there has been some cooperative rhetoric 
between their leaders.  In 2011, the Argentine Defense Minister Arturo Puricelli 
suggested the formation of a South American Space Agency with support from Brazil.229  
As previously mentioned, even Venezuela has offered to work cooperatively with other 
nations in the region.  Brazil has also participated in a limited role in the ISS program, 
sending an astronaut to the station in 2006.230  
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 Informed by the space nationalism school of thought, the hypothesis of this paper 
is that the recent insertion of military and intelligence assets by lesser and new space 
faring nations has led to a decrease in cooperative space activity.  According to the data, 
the hypothesis has been proven quantitatively wrong, but its informing theories have 
significant supporting evidence.  There has been no pervasive decrease in cooperative 
space activity because of nations’ new military and intelligence assets, and in some cases 
cooperation has actually increased.  This would appear to directly conflict with the 
hypothesis and instead align with the global institutionalism school of thought.  However, 
there is evidence to suggest the space domain is more competitive despite increased 
cooperation between certain nations, underscored by connotations of competition within 
these new cooperative agreements. This evidence is more in line with the space 
nationalism or pessimistic technological determinism schools of thought.  
Japan’s establishment of national security space activities in the form of its IGS 
satellites was in direct response to an increased threat from North Korea (a non-space 
faring nation).  Though this was a major shift for Japan’s space policy, the country 
increased its level of cooperation in the international space community.  Notably, Japan’s 
Basic Plan for Space Policy of 2009 acknowledged China as a premier space faring 
country and promoted the establishment of a close relationship with China in space 
activities.231  Although this and other evidence regarding Japan’s increased level of 
cooperative space activities clearly contradicts the hypothesis and is more in line with 
global institutionalism, Japan’s simultaneous enhancement of bilateral relations with the 
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US military may in fact demonstrate a level of increased competition. The US-Japan 
space relationship could be seen as a way for Japan to balance against China militarily, 
and as an attempt to challenge China for regional dominance in the space domain.  China 
is the regional leader in military space capabilities, but Japan is in a position to compete 
for that role soon if it chooses to do so.232  Bilateral and multilateral cooperative 
agreements such as those with South Korea and India may help Japan act as a regional 
leader in space activities. Thus, the case of Japan suggests that although Japan increased 
its level of cooperative space activities, this cooperation does not necessarily support the 
views from the global institutionalism school of thought that these types of agreements 
decrease competition in space. 
The case of Turkey shows evidence both for and against the hypothesis.  Israel 
protested Turkey’s development of spy satellites with the ability to image Israeli territory 
with high resolution.  Additionally, companies from several nations that already had 
military relations with Turkey chose not to bid on its request for proposal for the Göktürk 
program.  The latter detail is not direct evidence for the hypothesis, but does display a 
certain level of discomfort from the international community about Turkey’s intent to 
develop spy satellites.  Turkey also championed its newfound independence from other 
nations’ technological assistance (though it received significant aid from a European 
partnership on Göktürk-2), and stated its intention to further develop indigenous space 
capabilities.  This evidence generally supports the hypothesis and points to a more 
competitive space environment.  However, Ankara also signed cooperative agreements 
with APSCO (led by China) and ESA during the period of study, as well as a bilateral 
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cooperative agreement with Japan.  Therefore, while Ankara is demonstrating 
competition by touting its independence and regional power, it is also maintaining and 
adding new cooperative space agreements with the EU and China, suggesting they are 
engaging more in cooperative space activities than competition or conflict. 
The South American countries provide more evidence against the hypothesis than 
for.  Brazil and Venezuela’s partnership with China in space activities is emblematic of a 
push from South American nations for independence from US leadership.  Cooperative 
agreements between Brazil and the US began to deteriorate during the 1990s when the 
US used the Missile Technology Control Regime treaty to prevent Brazil from producing 
a rocket for its space program.233  Though the US and Brazil have limited cooperation on 
other space activities such as the LANDSAT mission, the US is still seemingly reluctant 
to engage with Brazil (and other South American nations) fully on space activities.234 
These US regulations provide no barrier for China to work with these nations, and 
Beijing seized the opportunity to establish cooperative relationships. These bilateral 
agreements with China, in combination with the purported willingness from several 
South American nations to develop a bloc-controlled space agency, demonstrate a more 
cooperative space environment has emerged since the establishment of South American 
national security space programs.  Again, however, there is also an undercurrent of 
competition.  The US is clearly reluctant to cooperate in space activities in this region.  
Additionally, the US and China are competitors in the space domain, and China’s 
influence in the region could be interpreted as a way to assert more influence in global 
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space affairs.235  Moreover, the alignment of these South American nations with China 
indicates they may be looking to balance to some degree against the dominant space 
power in their hemisphere – the US. 
The majority of evidence suggests that the insertion of military and intelligence 
assets into space by lesser and new space faring nations has resulted in a stable or 
increased number of cooperative space activities as compared to the first fifty years of 
space exploration. While this evidence proves the hypothesis quantitatively wrong, it 
does not indicate that the space environment is more cooperative because of these 
agreements – as the theory of global institutionalism would suggest.  There are legitimate 
arguments to be made that many of the cooperative agreements established by these 
lesser and new space faring nations have created a more competitive international space 
environment, placing the current status of the domain more in line with space 
nationalism. In the cases of Japan, Turkey, and Venezuela, the data suggest these nations 
are vying for regional dominance in space activities, and are utilizing cooperative 
agreements only as a means to strengthen their space programs to achieve that goal.  
Conclusion 
This paper set out to determine how the recent insertion of military and 
intelligence assets into space by lesser and new space-faring nations has changed how 
nations interaction in space.  By establishing key underlying concepts of the space 
domain, it was determined that in some ways, interactions between nations in the space 
domain parallel interactions in previous new frontiers. It was also determined that several 
schools of thought about how nations have and will continue to interact in space have 
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emerged, though each school has waxed and waned in its applicability. Informed by these 
notions, a hypothesis was formed that that the recent insertion of military and intelligence 
assets by lesser and new space faring nations has led to a decrease in cooperative space 
activity. A series of case studies was undertaken, surveying the behaviors of space faring 
nations after the first insertion of military and intelligence assets by several lesser and 
new space faring nations.  After examining the case studies, the hypothesis was proven 
wrong, but its supporting theories were supported.  While there has been an increased 
level of cooperation in space, there is evidence to suggest the domain is now a more 
competitive environment. 
In reaching these conclusions, this entry into the discussion of the politics of 
space security demonstrates key lessons about how intelligence and military activities 
influence the interaction between nations in this domain. The conclusions of this study 
suggest that the theory of global institutionalism, which states that cooperative 
agreements will lead to a more peaceful use of space, may not be true today.  The 
theories of space nationalism and technological determinism are most supported by the 
data, as space has continually been militarized, and nations have established bilateral 
agreements to help each other establish national security space programs.  However, 
because of the limitations on available data (many nations do not publish information 
about their national security space programs and strategies), and the scope of this paper, 
these conclusions are limited only to the cases studied.  More research should be done on 
the nature of cooperative agreements between all space faring nations since 2000.  A 
quantitative analysis of the amount of cooperative space agreements prior to and after 
2000 would also prove valuable in an assessment of how nations interact in space. More 
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research should also be conducted on how bilateral cooperative agreements that help one 
nation establish military and intelligence functions have impacted international relations 






This thesis has provided three in-depth studies that illustrate the wide reaching 
impacts of intelligence activities outside of the world of espionage.  The cases in each 
chapter examined the ways in which intelligence activities shape other, more observable, 
arenas such as international relations, policy-making, and the behaviors of violent non-
state actors (VNSA).  In doing so, this portfolio is aimed at enriching the field of 
intelligence studies by stepping outside of the existing, inward-looking research that 
dominates the field today.  Additionally, the portfolio provides a framework for further 
research on the role intelligence activities may play in other areas.  
The first chapter explored the impact U.S. intelligence analysis had on the Cold 
War policy of attempting to enact regime change in other countries.  Through a series of 
case studies, it was determined that intelligence analysis was likely able to have 
influenced policymaking.  This research was limited in its scope in that it only examined 
the impact intelligence analysis had on one Cold War policy (regime change). The 
research design used in this study could be applied to an expanded study on whether 
intelligence analysis was able to inform another identifiable policy.  A body of research 
along these lines would have implications for improving intelligence analysis in the long 
run.  The data in this particular study were also insufficient to unequivocally prove the 
direct influence of intelligence analysis on policy making.  The research could be 
augmented by examining the relationship between policymakers and the intelligence 
apparatus at their disposal, which may shed light on how intelligence analysis was 
received by policymakers.  This addition would strengthen the case in determining if 
intelligence analysis did indeed have direct influence on policy. While there are 
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limitations in this study, it is nonetheless a valuable demonstration of the 
interconnectedness between intelligence and policymaking, further illuminating the 
impact that intelligence may have on shaping state behavior.     
The second chapter examined how violent non-state actors’ intelligence functions 
have developed over the past two decades (since 1997).  Three case studies determined 
that the intelligence functions of VNSA generally showed significant developments over 
the past two decades and that these developments largely mirrored developments seen in 
in states’ intelligence agencies, although delayed.  This research carries with it many 
implications.  First, it demonstrates that intelligence functions play a key role in the 
continued existence of VNSA. Second, the data show that VNSA continue to learn, 
adapt, and often improve their intelligence functions over time.  Lastly, VNSA were 
shown to learn from state intelligence activities and model their own intelligence 
functions in a similar manner.  Each of these conclusions illustrate that the intelligence 
activities of states have had an impact on the behaviors of VNSA, and more research 
should be conducted on other ways VNSA learn of and utilize intelligence activities.  The 
research should be expanded to include other VNSA to help broaden our understanding 
of their intelligence activities.  A future trend analysis of developments in both states’ 
and VNSA’s intelligence functions may also provide indicators as to how VNSA will 
develop in the future.   
The third chapter assessed how the recent insertion of space based military and 
intelligence assets by lesser and new space faring nations has impacted how nations 
interaction in space.  A series of case studies determined that though there has been an 
increased level of cooperation in space after the recent increase in new military and 
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intelligence space programs, the domain might in fact now be a more competitive 
environment.  The data suggest that new nations inserting military and intelligence 
systems into space are vying for regional dominance in space activities and are utilizing 
cooperative agreements as a means to strengthen their space programs.  This study 
provided a rare opportunity to analyze how intelligence activities impact international 
relations, an area that is difficult to research due to its clandestine nature.  The research 
showed that in some cases, nations were proud of their new intelligence gathering 
satellites and publicized them to demonstrate their technological prowess.  This type of 
public display of a nation’s intelligence capabilities is not commonplace, thus making it 
unique.  The conclusions from this study help further our understanding of the impacts 
intelligence activities have on international relations, a significant contribution to the 
literature on international intelligence activities.  The research, however, should be 
expanded to include other new space faring nations that have recently inserted military 
and intelligence assets into space, though the data in this area is limited.  Additionally, 
the research design could be employed to study how the establishment of other military 
and intelligence functions has impacted international relations. 
The studies in this portfolio exemplify the reality that intelligence activities do not 
exist in a vacuum – they have wide reaching influences on other activities such as policy 
making, geopolitics, and international relations.  By demonstrating the bearing that 
intelligence activities have on state behavior and interaction, the implications of these 
studies highlight that the impacts of intelligence activities should also be considered in 
other area studies.  The research designs in this portfolio may be used as a framework to 
conduct further multidisciplinary research, and may reveal additional instances in which 
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intelligence activities play an unconsidered or unexpected role.  This kind of research will 
require the continued declassification of historical material on intelligence activities; 
otherwise it will remain limited in its scope.  In examining some of the expected and 
unexpected effects of intelligence activities, this portfolio is intended to elevate the 
visibility of the impacts intelligence activities have in other arenas and hopes to inspire 








A Brief Timeline of New Space-based Military & Intelligence Programs 
  
1957: Sputnik 1 launched by 
USSR 1958: US launches first 
satellite, Explorer 1 
1965: France becomes third 
country to enter space 
1970: Japan becomes fourth country 
to enter space 
1970: China becomes fifth 
country to enter space 
1987: USSR and US begin 
cooperating on civil space missions 
1998: North Korea launches 
missile that flies over Japan 
2000: Brazilian-Chinese dual-use 
earth observation satellite program, 
CBERS, launched 
2003: Japan changes national 
space policy and launches first 
intelligence satellite 
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